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EMPIRICALLY EVALUATING CLAIMS ABOUT
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION*
SUSAN D. FRANCK**
As a blossoming field of study, empirical legal scholarship can offer
valuable insights on issues of international importance. The resolution
of disputes from investment treaties is one such issue that affects
international relations, implicates international legality of domestic
government conduct, and puts millions of taxpayer dollars at risk.
However, there is little empirical work that transparently explores this
area. While suggesting there has been a "litigation explosion,"
commentators make untested assertions about investment treaty
disputes. As the first research article that explains its methodology and
results, this Article is a modest attempt to evaluate claims about
investment treaty arbitration. The Article explores: (1) who is involved
in arbitration and what is arbitrated, (2) increases in awards, (3)
win/loss rates, (4) amounts claimed and awarded, (5) arbitration costs,
(6) use of other dispute resolution processes, and (7) nationality and
gender of arbitrators. Subjecting these areas to empirical scrutiny
provides information that sets the stage for future research to provide
insights to government officials responsible for negotiating investment
treaties and parties planning their dispute resolution strategies.
Replication and convergence of such research offers an opportunity to
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promote dialogue about and evaluation of the appropriateness of a
dispute resolution process with profound public implications.
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"For the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the
man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics
and the master of economics."
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'
INTRODUCTION
With surges in international investment and the number of treaties
protecting foreign investment,2 there is increasing interest in how
investment treaty conflict is managed. Given the implications for
international relations, public policy, and the fiscal responsibility of
governments,3 this interest is not misplaced. A purported "litigation
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,469 (1897).
2. Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1529-47
(2005).
3. MARY BOT-rARI & LORI WALLACH, PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA'S THREAT TO
SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRACY: THE RECORD OF NAFTA CHAPTER 1 1 INVESTOR-STATE
CASES 1994-2005, at vii-viii (2005) [hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN, RECORD], available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Chapter%2011%2OReport%2OFinal.pdf; see also Susan D.
Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do
Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future?, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47, 49 (2005)
(noting that the increase in international investment disputes "have a significant financial
impact"); Michael D. Goldhaber, Wanted: A World Investment Court, FOCUS EUR., Summer
2007]
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explosion"4 in investment treaty conflict has led to a teething period.
Parties and nonparties have cheered and jeered the efficacy, efficiency, and
fairness of the current system for resolving investment treaty disputes.'
Meanwhile, commentators make empirically unsubstantiated claims about
investment treaty conflict, sometimes designed to cast doubt upon the
credibility of investment treaties and their dispute resolution mechanisms.6
Recent comments from the President of Bolivia suggest that these claims
may contribute to efforts to withdraw from institutions affiliated with the
World Bank.7
Empirical legal scholarship8 can and should aid the examination of the
current system to test conventional wisdom, dispel myths, and provide data
2004, at 26, 29, available at http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/investmentcourt
04.html (explaining claims brought by investors against Argentina were worth $10 billion).
4. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the purported increase in treaty arbitrations).
5. Compare Charles H. Brower II, Structure Legitimacy and NAFTA 's Investment Chapter,
36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37, 93-94 (2000) (expressing concerns about the legitimacy of
resolving NAFTA treaty claims), and Franck, supra note 2, at 1545-47 (expressing concerns
about the legitimacy of resolution of investment treaty disputes), and Carlos G. Garcia, All the
Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of
Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 301, 347-55 (2004) (outlining concerns about
inconsistent jurisprudence in investment treaty arbitration), with Judith A.E. Gill, Inconsistent
Decisions: An Issue to be Addressed or a Fact of Life?, 2 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 12, 15
(2005) (suggesting concerns about the system will be addressed over time), and Daniel M. Price,
NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve?, 26 CAN.-
U.S. L.J. (SUPPLEMENT) 1, 9 (2001) (suggesting the system can handle inconsistency and "fears
about over[-]reaching arbitral panels are quite premature").
6. See, e.g., SARAH ANDERSON & SARA GRUSKY, FOOD & WATER WATCH, CHALLENGING
CORPORATE INVESTOR RULE: HOW THE WORLD BANK'S INVESTMENT COURT, FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS, AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES HAVE UNLEASHED A NEW ERA OF
CORPORATE POWER AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT, at ix (2007), available at http://www.ips-
dc.org/reports/070430-challengingcorporateinvestorrule.pdf (outlining a series of problems
related to investment treaty dispute resolution).
7. News Release, Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes ("ICSID"), Bolivia Submits a
Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (May 16, 2007),
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/05-16-07.htm; Latin Lawyer Online, Venezuela and
Bolivia Threaten to Leave ICSID (May 3, 2007), http://www.latinlawyer.conarticle.php?id=
11638; see also Leslie Mazoch, Chavez Takes Cool View Toward OAS, Says Latin America
Better Off Without World Bank, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 30, 2007, http://www.huffington
post.com/huff-wires/20070430/la-gen-venezuela-leftist-alternative (quoting Evo Morales as
saying "Governments in Latin America and I think all over the world never win the cases. The
transnationals always win" and Hugo Chavez as saying "I didn't know that [ICSID] existed, but
we're pulling out anyway").
8. For the purposes of this Article, empirical legal scholarship involves the application of
social science research methods-whether qualitative, quantitative, or mixed-methods-to gather
and describe data and test hypotheses related to legal issues. Christopher R. Drahozal,
Arbitration by the Numbers: The State of Empirical Research on International Commercial
Arbitration, 22 ARB. INT'L 291, 292 (2006); see also N. William Hines, Empirical Scholarship:
What Should We Study and How Should We Study It?, AALS NEWSL. (Ass'n of Am. Law Schs.,
Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2005, at 1, 3, available at http://www.aals.org/services-newsletter-pres
Feb05.php (explaining research is "empirical if it involves a systematic investigation of real
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that can promote efficient conflict management. Scholars call for a
systematic analysis of investment treaty claims.9 However, there are few
valid and reliable empirical assessments of investment treaty disputes.
Such analysis is critical.
There is an ongoing debate about whether investment treaties are
worth the cost.' ° Economists and political scientists have begun to assess
whether treaties achieve their purported objective of increasing levels of
foreign investment." There has, unfortunately, been little empirical work
operationalizing other variables, particularly those related to costs.
Empirical insights are nevertheless vital. They have the potential to
aid major stakeholders such as governments and investors, their lawyers,
arbitrators, and the public. Government officials negotiating treaties to
secure foreign investment may benefit from information about what
disputes are likely to arise, what government behavior is likely to be the
most problematic, what industries are likely to experience the greatest
conflict, and what the government's potential financial exposure is. With
this information, governments can better decide whether to enter into
treaties. It would also aid the design of treaties that could address real
problems and achieve governmental objectives. Similarly, parties in the
midst of a dispute could use information to assess the costs and benefits of
different dispute resolution options to facilitate selection of an effective
world facts or actual societal functioning, whether by quantitative or qualitative methods, for the
purpose of making law more effective and just or the administration of justice more fair").
9. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, Explanations for the Increased Recourse to Treaty-Based
Investment Dispute Settlement: Resolving the Struggle of Life Against Form?, in COHERENCE
AND CONSISTENCY IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Karl P. Sauvant ed., forthcoming
2007) (manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Salacuse,
Explanations] (observing that there is little evidence about negotiation of investment treaty
conflict and suggesting it should be explored); Jeswald W. Salacuse, Alternative Methods of
Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution 3 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Salacuse, ADR] (urging that "states should study
ways of enhancing [the] use [of ADR]"). See generally Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment
Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2007)
(recommending analysis of investment conflict to design dispute resolution methods).
10. See, e.g., Olivia Chung, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and Its
Effect on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 953, 962 (2007); Johanna
Kalb, The Institutional Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties, INT'L AFF. J. U.C. DAVIS,
Winter 2006, available at http://davisiaj.comlcontent/view/l10/86/; Paolo Di Rosa, The Recent
Wave of Arbitrations Against Argentina Under Bilateral Investment Treaties: Background and
Principal Legal Issues, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 41, 74 n.88 (2004).
11. The literature on this issue is mixed. While some scholars suggest that signing an
investment treaty does increase foreign investment, others observe the opposite effect. Susan D.
Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Rule of Law, 19
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BuS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 348-52 (2007) (surveying the empirical literature
including studies by Hallward-Dreimer, Rose-Ackerman and Tobin, the United Nations, Salacuse
and Sullivan, Neumayer and Spess, and Swenson).
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strategy. These scenarios suggest that empirical analysis could provide
critical information to aid effective conflict management, reduce
investment risk, and promote international development. An increased
emphasis on empirical dimensions of legal scholarship12 in this area will
not solve all the problems, but it offers an opportunity to make more
informed policy choices.
As a modest attempt at beginning to provide foundational information,
this Article provides the first analysis of investment treaty conflict that
examines treaty arbitration awards and explains the methodology and
substantive results. Part I discusses investment treaties, investment treaty
conflict, and how arbitration can be used to resolve disputes. Part II
discusses the application of empirical methods to investment treaty dispute
resolution. Part III describes the project's research methodology.
Part IV provides descriptive quantitative data needed for a systematic
understanding of investment treaty disputes. It presents seven claims about
investment treaty arbitration and uses data to assess them. The data
suggests that some claims were correct; namely, that the number of
arbitration awards increased, arbitration costs could be substantial, there
were a small number of settlements, and a small fraction of arbitrators were
women. The data also points to flaws in the conventional wisdom.
Countries in the developing world were not the only respondents. A large
percentage of claims were brought against Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development ("OECD") countries, whereas there were very
few claims brought against the Least Developed Countries ("LDCs").
Additionally, investors did not win more disputes than governments, and
tribunals did not generally award large damages. Despite assertions that an
arbitration "mafia" decides cases, there was a relatively large number of
arbitrators and a small number of arbitrators with repeat appointments.
After describing and analyzing the data, this Article concludes by
synthesizing notable results, making an initial assessment of the dispute
resolution system, and suggesting areas for future research. By taking an
empirical approach to investment treaty conflict, data can methodically
assess claims, evaluate the existing dispute resolution processes, and
encourage the creation and use of appropriate dispute resolution systems.
12. N. William Hines articulated the need to "focus attention on the empirical dimension of
our scholarly research." See Hines, supra note 8, at 3. The theme of the American Association of
Law School's annual conference was: "Empirical Scholarship: What Should We Study and How
Should We Study It?" See N. William Hines, Association of American Law Schools Annual
Meeting, http://www.aals.org/am2006/theme.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). Cornell Law
School, New York University School of Law, and the University of Texas Law School held the
First Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies in October 2006. See Conference on
Empirical Legal Studies 2006, http://www.utexas.edu/law/conferences/cels2006/ (last visited
Nov. 10, 2007).
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This research is only the first step in a larger process. Future research
should replicate and expand this analysis so that converging operations can
produce valid and reliable research conclusions in an area of international
importance.
I. INVESTMENT TREATIES AND INVESTMENT RELATED CONFLICT
A. The Role of Foreign Investment
Foreign investment has a critical impact on the world economy and
development. 3 In previous decades, foreign investment involved billions
of dollars annually. Projections suggest that investment inflows will be
close to US$1.5 trillion by 2010.' 4
While its precise definition is a subject of debate, 5 foreign investment
archetypically involves a large infrastructure project. It might range from
construction of a road to financing and development of a power plant' 6 to
exploitation of intellectual property rights 7 or to other commercial
activity.
18
13. R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND
COMMENTARY 2-7 (2005); see Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Foreign Investments, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 435,435-49 (R. Benhardt ed. 1995).
14. ECON. INTELLIGENCE UNIT, WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS TO 2010: BOOM OR
BACKLASH 6 (2006), available at http://www.cpii.columbia.edu/pubs/documents/WIP-to2010
SPECIALEDITION.pdf. Net private capital flows in emerging markets are a key source of this
investment. See Diana I. Gregg, Flows to Emerging Markets Set Record of $553 Billion in 2006,
Remain Strong, INT'L BUS. & FIN. DAILY, June 5, 2007, available at http://www.bna.coml (select
"International Business & Finance Daily" in the drop-down box at the top of the page; then
search for "Flows to Emerging Markets Set Record of $553 Billion in 2006, Remain Strong").
15. Many treaties define "investment." See Treaty Between Government of the United
States of America and the Government of __ Concerning the Encouraged and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, Feb. 5, 2004, 3, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
29030.doc [hereinafter 2004 U.S. Model BIT] (defining investment). The definition of
"investment" is otherwise the subject of debate. See generally PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN
KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS
OF POLITICAL RISK (1997) (defining "foreign direct investment" by contrasting it with "portfolio
investment"); Riesenfeld, supra note 13, at 435 (defining "foreign investment" as the "transfer of
funds or materials from one country ... to another country ... to be used in the conduct of an
enterprise in that country in return for a direct or indirect participation in the earnings of the
enterprise").
16. See Joshua Robbins, The Emergence of Positive Obligations in Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 403,406-07 (2006).
17. Ingo Selting, FDI and International Protection of Intellectual Property, in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 205-06 (Daniel D. Bradlow & Alfred Escher eds.,
1999).
18. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Dispute Settlement: International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Requirements Ratione Materiae, 19-24, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.4 (2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc
232add4_en.pdf (suggesting service, construction, trade, and financial related investments can be
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Because of its importance to development and economic prosperity,
there is competition among developed and developing countries to attract
foreign investment. Governments use various strategies-at a national or
sub-national level-to facilitate this objective. Some of these strategies
might be straightforward, such as liberalizing an economic sector or
providing tax incentives.19 Other strategies might be more complex, such
as improving the court system or creating effective alternative dispute
resolution. °
B. Investment Treaties
One tactic governments might use to promote foreign investment is
signing an investment treaty. 21 An investment treaty is an agreement made
between two or more governments that safeguards investments made in the
territory of other signatory countries.22 For example, the United States and
Ukraine signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty ("BIT"). 23  In it, the United
States provides a series of rights to Ukrainian investors investing in the
"investments"). But see id. at 17 (noting ICS1D refused to register a case because a supply
contract for the sale of goods was not an "investment").
19. Governments could provide fiscal incentives (like tax concessions or subsidies), improve
domestic infrastructure, promote a skilled labor force, establish agencies to promote investment,
improve the regulatory environment, or enter into treaties. See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: A BETTER INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE 56-58 (2004),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/Resources/complete-report.pdf;
World Bank, Policies to Attract Foreign Direct Investment, http://rru.worldbank.org/PapersLinks/
Policies-Attract-Foreign-Direct-Investment/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). While the methodology
has been subject to critique, some research suggests that protecting intellectual property rights
fosters investment. Paul J. Heald, Misreading a Canonical Work: An Analysis of Mansfield's
1994 Study, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 309, 309-11 (2003).
20. Franck, supra note 11, at 340 (discussing how India and China are attempting to improve
their alternative dispute resolution systems as a tactic for fostering foreign investment).
21. While the stated goal of signing these international investment agreements is largely to
increase foreign investment levels, empirical analyses have not determined whether these treaties
achieve this objective. See generally Franck, supra note 3, at 48-51 (outlining the issue); see
also supra note 11.
22. Franck, supra note 3, at 52. While these treaties typically take the form of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, there are also Multilateral Investment Treaties and integrated Free Trade
Agreements. See, e.g., United States Trade Representative, Central American-Dominican
Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, ch. 10, Aug. 5, 2004, http://tcc.export.gov/Trade-
Agreements/AllTradeAgreements/CentralAmericanFreeTradeTA.asp; North American Free
Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch.ll, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 612; Antonio R. Parra,
Provisions on the Settlement of Investment Disputes in Modem Investment Laws, Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment, 12 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV.
L.J. 287, 287-88 (1997).
23. See Treaty Between the United States of America and Ukraine Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Mar. 4, 1994, U.S.-Ukraine, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 103-37, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us-ukraine.pdf.
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United States. The reciprocal nature of the treaty gives U.S. investors in
Ukraine the same rights as their Ukrainian counterparts.
By the end of 2005, there were at least 2,495 investment treaties
signed by 175 different countries,24 and around 75% are in force. 5 The
proliferation of these investment treaties was a paradigm shift for investor
rights on both substantive and procedural levels.
1. Substantive Rights
Investment treaties articulate substantive investment rights26 and
typically provide foreigners with an economic bill of rights from the host
state. These rights might include guarantees of appropriate compensation
for expropriation, promises of freedom from unreasonable or
discriminatory measures, guarantees of national treatment for the
investment, assurances of fair and equitable treatment, promises that
investments will receive full protection and security, undertakings that a
sovereign will honor its obligations, and assurances that foreign investment
will receive treatment no less favorable than that accorded under
international law.27
2. Procedural Rights: Resolving Investment Treaty Disputes
A key innovation of investment treaties has been to grant investors
procedural rights granting direct access to dispute resolution that redresses
their grievances against host governments. Rather than having substantive
24. U. N. Conference on Trade and Dev., The Entry into Force of Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BITS), 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/9 (2006), http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/webiteiia20069-en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, Entry into Force]; U.N. Conference on Trade
and Dev., Research Note: Research Developments In International Investment Agreements, 1-3,
13-15, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/I (Aug. 30, 2005), http://www.unctad.org/
sections/ditedir/docs/webiteiit2005 l -en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, Research Developments].
25. UNCTAD, Entry into Force, supra note 24, at 2 (acknowledging that out of the 2,495
investment treaties in existence at the end of 2005, only 75.8% had entered into force); Marie-
Franc Houde, Novel Features in Recent OCED Bilateral Investment Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES 143, 143-44 (2006) (suggesting the number of international
investment agreements in force is around 1,700).
26. See, e.g., Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 641 (1998) (discussing the
controversy surrounding standards for international expropriation, including the rise and fall of
the Hull Rule).
27. See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, 165-
204 (1995); see also Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on
Investment Protection 339-50, in RECUEIL DES COURS 269 (1997) (describing substantive rights
in investment treaties).
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rights that are legally unenforceable,28 treaties give investors a forum to
redress alleged wrongs.2 9
Such wrongs typically arise when government conduct adversely
affects foreign investment. These might involve a traditional international
law violation, such as nationalization of a business without fair
compensation.3 ° They may also involve more subtle government conduct,
such as (1) revocation of a banking license,3 (2) change in the
interpretation of tax law that decreases an anticipated refund,32 (3) passage
of an environmental regulation that has a disparate and adverse financial
impact upon foreign investors,33 (4) failure to advise an investor about
licenses needed to operate an investment,34 or (5) alleged breach of a
commercial contract to which the government is a party.35
In the past, investors had more limited and less appealing options for
redressing international law violations. First, this meant investors might
have to accept the political will of their own government, the host
government, or both when deciding whether to address the investor's
complaints. 6  Second, investors might have to litigate in the host
government's national courts where defenses of sovereign immunity are
28. See Franck, supra note 11, at 343 n.25 (observing that rights that cannot be enforced
have been historically viewed as a legal fiction); Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of
International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining, 36
J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 190 (2007) (analyzing a random sample of treaties from a U.N. database but
finding that only half of the treaties contained dispute resolution provisions).
29. See generally William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed
Countries: Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 5-14 (2006) (describing the evolution from diplomatic protection to treaties of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation to investment treaties); Franck, supra note 2, at 1525-29
(same).
30. Eletronica Sicula, S.p.A (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 4 (July 20, 1989).
31. Genin v. Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award (June 25, 2001), 316, 17 ICSID
REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 395 (2002), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Genin-Award.pdf
[hereinafter Genin Award].
32. Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final
Award (July 1, 2004), http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Occidental-Ecuador-
FinalAward- IJul2004.pdf.
33. Methanex Corp. v. United States, UNCITRAL, Final Award (Aug. 3, 2005), 44 I.L.M.
1345 (2005), http://www.state.gov/s/l1/c5818.htm. [hereinafter Methanex Award].
34. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/I, Final Award (Aug. 30,
2000), 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MetacladAward-English.pdf
[hereinafter Metalclad Award].
35. SGS Socift6 Gfnhrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/6, Decision of Jurisdiction (Jan. 29, 2004), 18 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 307
(2003), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SGSvPhil-final00 .pdf; see also LG&E Energy Corp. v.
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/I, Decision on Liability (Oct. 3, 2006),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LGEArgentinaLiability.pdf (finding a failure to adhere to
obligations where there was an "abrogation of the guarantees under the statutory framework").
These are "umbrella clause" claims. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 27, at 81-82.
36. Franck, supra note 2, at 1536-37.
2007] INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
often available.37 Third, investors may simply have to absorb the cost of
adverse government action by doing nothing or making a claim under their
political risk insurance.3" The investor-state dispute resolution mechanism
in many treaties, in contrast, permits an investor to bring the relevant host
government to the dispute resolution table.39
No uniform dispute resolution process exists because treaties are
individually negotiated.4" There appear to be patterns, however. Many
treaties have a two-tiered dispute resolution process.4 At the first level,
investors may (1) engage in some non-binding form of dispute resolution,42
37. Id. at 1537.
38. Salacuse, Explanations, supra note 9, at 13; Franck, supra note 2, at 1620 n.469
(discussing political risk insurance). Investors may also have a contractual right to arbitrate for
disputes arising out of a commercial contract with an arbitration agreement. See generally PAUL
E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL RISK 151-214 (1996) (discussing political
risk insurance and arbitration).
39. Investor-state dispute resolution is distinct from the state-to-state dispute resolution. See
Bernardo M. Cremades, Has the Proliferation of BITs Gone Too Far?: Is It Now Time for a
Multilateral Investment Treaty?, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 89, 90-91 (2004) (describing the use
of state-to-state arbitration to interpret a treaty); Franck, supra note 3, at 53 n.26 (discussing cases
where state-to-state arbitration was initiated after an investor-state claim). Not all treaties,
however, permit direct investor-state dispute resolution. See Agreement Between Japan and the
Republic of the Philippines for an Economic Partnership, Japan-Phil., art. 107, Sept. 9, 2006,
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/philippine/epa06O9/main.pdf; Dodge, supra
note 29, at 22-26 (discussing the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement).
40. While there are important textual and substantive similarities in the terms of investment
treaties, there are nevertheless variations. See Jason W. Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the
Empirical Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 33 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2008)
(Univ. of Wisc. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1053 at 11-12, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015088); U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Investment Provisions in
Economic Integration Agreements, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/10 (2006), http://www.
unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit2005 I Oen.pdf.
41. See U.N. CTR. ON TRANSNATIONAL CORP., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 6-0
(1988); DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 27, at 119-20; U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev.,
Dispute Settlement: Investor-State, 12-14, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/30 (2005), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit30_en.pdf.
42. While some treaties require mandatory "amicable resolution" or negotiation, other
treaties may make it a discretionary option. Compare United States BIT Model Negotiating Text
of January 11, 1982, art. VII(2), reprinted in KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES
INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICIES AND PRACTICE app. A-I, at 6 (1992) (stating that according to
the 1982 U.S. Model BIT "the parties shall initially seek to resolve the dispute by consultation
and negotiation ... [and] ... may agree to rely upon non-binding, third-party procedures"
(emphasis added)), with Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of__ Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment,
195, art. IX (Apr. 1994), reprinted in U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., International
Investment Instruments: A Compendium, 201-02, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DTC/30 (Vol. III) (1996)
(failing to reference any type of non-binding dispute resolution), and 2004 U.S. Model BIT,
supra note 15, art. 23 (suggesting parties "should initially seek to resolve the dispute through
consultation and negotiation, which may include the use of non-binding, third-party procedures"
(emphasis added)).
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(2) litigate the dispute in local courts,43 and/or (3) wait a few months after
submitting a dispute notice to "cool off' prior to submitting the dispute to
arbitration.' At a second level, provided an investor complies with the
requisite preconditions, 45 governments often offer to resolve treaty disputes
through arbitration and let investors elect where to resolve those claims.
The potential fora might include 46 an ad hoc tribunal organized under the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL")
Arbitration Rules or institutional arbitration at the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce ("SCC") or the World Bank's International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID").
47
As a concrete example, suppose that a U.S. investor buys a privatized
group of Ukrainian radio stations, develops broadcasting capacity, and
becomes the market leader of innovative radio programming. Then
imagine that some government conduct prevents the investor from utilizing
the broadcast frequencies, and the government fails to renew the investor's
broadcasting license. The U.S. investor-who once had a profitable
business-wants to redress the perceived wrong. This is not unlike Lemire
v. Ukraine,4" where Mr. Lemire attempted to resolve his dispute with
43. Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial of
Justice Claims, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 809, 877 (2005); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of
International Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL' Y 157, 174-75 (2005).
44. Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerg, Trade and Investment: Foreign Direct
Investment Through Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 50 n.225
(2005); see also 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 15, arts. 24(2), 24(3) (providing an example of
the process). One recent exception is a treaty between Japan and the Philippines that has only one
tier of mandatory mediation. See supra note 39.
45. Tribunals do not always enforce these prerequisites. Christoph Schreuer, Traveling the
BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INV. &
TRADE 231, 233-36 (2004) (nonobservance of waiting period and other preconditions as
procedural formalities, which are not followed).
46. See Franck, supra note 2, at 1541-42 (discussing how countries sometimes let investors
choose between national courts and arbitration). Appeals of national court decisions presumably
would be through the national courts and not made in arbitration.
47. See Franck, supra note 3, at 54. Typically, investors select an arbitrator and the
government selects another. Under the ICSID Convention, parties can agree on the appointment
of the president of the tribunal. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States art. 37(2)(b), March 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524, 1538 (1966)
[hereinafter ICSID Convention]. By contrast, under ad hoc UNCITRAL arbitration, party-
appointed arbitrators agree on the Chair. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
Arbitration Rules art. 7(1) (1976), Apr. 28, 1976, 15 I.L.M. 701, 705 [hereinafter UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules]. Where there is an appointment problem with the process, an arbitral
institution or other appointing authority will step in to make the requisite appointments. Id. art.
7(2)(b).
48. Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/I (Sept. 18, 2000), 15 ICSID REV.-
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 530, 535-36 (2000) [hereinafter Lemire Award], http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/cases/lemire.pdf.
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Ukraine initially through amicable resolution but later initiated ICSID
arbitration.49
While Lemire provides an example of how investors might utilize a
treaty's dispute resolution provisions, it is not clear whether it is
representative of the broader population. Such case-specific data does not
provide general information about the different dispute resolution options
and how the processes function. More systematic consideration, with
enhanced external validity, is therefore warranted.
II. THE ROLE OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH
The idea that empiricism can enhance legal scholarship, education,
and practice generally is not new.5" But, its application to investment treaty
conflict is novel. There is little empirical evidence in this area,51 and this
void has consequences.52 Information about investment treaty arbitration
involves war stories and anecdotes shared at conferences or described on
49. Id. at 533-35; Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations for 1999: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. 38-99 (1998)
(testimony of Joseph Lemire, President of Gala Radio & TV Company and Olympic Champions,
Limited).
50. Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 811 (1999);
Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC.
323, 324 (1989); see, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 167, 187 (1920); Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training,
33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 581-82 (1983); Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do Empirical Legal
Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1741, 1744 (2004); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and
Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763, 779-80 (1986).
51. While this Article was in progress, papers have come out, but they provided neither a
broad perspective on investment treaty arbitration nor the transparent research methodology
needed to establish their validity and reliability. See generally ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra
note 6; Jeffery P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Citation Analysis
of Developing Jurisprudence, 24 J. INT'L ARB. 129 (2007); Noah Rubins et al., ICSID
Arbitrators: Is There a Club and Who Gets Invited, 3 GLOBAL ARB. REV. 11 (2006); Matthew
Weiniger & Matthew Page, Treaty Arbitration and Investment Disputes: Adding Up the Costs, I
GLOBAL ARB. REV. 44 (2006).
52. These difficulties may not be unexpected because the investment treaty dispute
resolution process is relatively new and data may not be available. See Asian Agriculture
Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, 30 I.L.M. 577, 580 (1990), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/AsianAgriculture.Award.pdf (providing the first publicly available
investment treaty award in 1990); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-1990S, at 8, U.N. Doc. UNCTADJITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales No.
E.98.II.D.8 (1998) (referring to the first BIT in 1959); Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and
Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 825-26 (2002) (suggesting empirical legal research can be inhibited by
"some unevenness in various fields' overall intellectual development and maturity" and "the
availability of data").
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listservs, blogs, or written publications.53 While a useful starting point,54
anecdotal information is insufficient, particularly if other data is available."
It can be misleading and promote myths.5 6  Making inferences from
anecdotes has questionable external validity as it draws data from a small
and potentially nonrepresentative subset. Empirical research contextualizes
anecdotes57 and aids the assessment of informational accuracy, reliability,
and validity. 8
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
("UNCTAD"), a prominent U.N. institution addressing international
investment and development, has published analysis about investment
treaty arbitration.59  While an important beginning,6' the proper
53. OGEMID is a listserv of investment treaty arbitration practitioners, arbitrators, parties,
and academics. Transnational Dispute Management is another source of information. Access to
these sources is in part restricted to members and/or those paying a fee.
54. Christopher R. Drahozal, Of Rabbits and Rhinoceri: A Survey of Empirical Research on
International Commercial Arbitration, 20 J. INT'L ARB. 23, 24 (2003) (discussing differences
between empirical research and anecdotes); Franck, supra note 11, at 347-48 (compiling
anecdotal evidence about how investment treaties impact foreign investment, observing the data's
limitations, and recommending empirical research).
55. See Heise, supra note 50, at 808 ("[A]necdotal evidence supplies a risky foundation
upon which to form generalizations applicable to a larger population."); Todd J. Zywicki, An
Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1463, 1475 (2005)
(discussing limitations of an anecdotal approach to empirical research). Compare Jonathan B.
Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power,
61 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 6 n.12 (1992) ("The plural of anecdote is data."), and Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1955 n.86 (1991) ("[Flor lawyers
the plural of anecdote is data."), with Edith Green, A Love-Hate Relationship, 18 JUST. SYS. J. 99,
100 (1995) ("The plural of anecdote is not data.").
56. The "no duty to rescue rule" in torts is based on an assumption that it is against human
nature to put one's life on the line for strangers. Nevertheless, Wesley Autrey's act of jumping in
front of a moving subway train to save the life of a stranger in January 2007 reflected David
Hyman's empirical results, namely that people commonly engage in not only cheap, easy rescues
but also hazardous acts of heroism that would not be required by law and may not be justified in
traditional cost-benefit terms. See Posting of Robert Justin Lipkin to Ratio Juris,
http://ratiojuris.blogspot.com/2007/01/when-empirical-legal-research-really.htmni (Jan. 9, 2007
09:55AM EST); see also David A. Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on
the Duty To Rescue, 84 TEx. L. REV. 653, 655-56 (2006).
57. See Theodore Eisenberg, Empirical Methods and the Law, 95 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 665,
668 (2000) (discussing ways in which empirical analysis can contextualize anecdotes).
58. See Drahozal, supra note 54, at 23 (observing the challenges of determining whether
anecdotes or cases "are typical or atypical, frequent or infrequent, ordinary or extreme"); Heise,
supra note 50, at 808 (discussing the lack of "mechanisms to assess anecdotal evidence for
truthfulness, typicality, or frequency").
59. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute
Settlement, IIA MONITOR No. 4, 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/HT/2005/2 (2005),
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiit20052_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, 2005 HA Monitor
No. 4] (claiming that as of November 2005 there were 219 known treaty-based investor-state
arbitrations); U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Occasional Note: International Investment
Disputes on the Rise, 1-7, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IT/2004/2 (Nov. 29, 2004)
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/webiteiit20042_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD,
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interpretation of these results requires more complete information about the
measurement, design, and data collection procedures than have been
provided.
At present, the lack of access to the data and methodology 6' inhibit the
replicability of the research and an estimation of the validity of UNCTAD's
research conclusions. For example, UNCTAD breaks data down into
categories-such as between developed and developing countries-without
describing the basis for the distinction.62 This creates uncertainty about the
reliability of the assertions about investment arbitration's impact upon the
developing world. Second, the unit of analysis is not always defined.
UNCTAD appears to analyze claims arising under international investment
treaties, but it is not possible to determine whether their figures were
inflated by including investor-state disputes arising under domestic law.63
The present research builds on UNCTAD's efforts but provides
Disputes on the Rise] (discussing the increase in international investor-state dispute settlements);
U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement,
ilA MONITOR No. 4, 2, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITEFIIA/2006/11 (2006),
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite pcbb/docs/webiteiia200611_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD,
2006 IIA Monitor No. 4]; U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Investor-State Disputes Arising
From Investment Treaties: A Review, 4-6, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITEIIIT/2005/4 (2005),
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20054_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD, Review] (discussing
the increase in number of claims involving international investment disputes).
60. Previous analyses have not captured the full scope of investment treaty arbitrations and
have a narrow focus, for example, on NAFTA claims. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA
Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected, Themes, Issues and Methods, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1384-85 (2003); see also Guillermo A. Alvarez & William W.
Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365,
366 (2003) (analyzing NAFTA arbitrations). Research focusing exclusively on ICSID might
overstate the number of investment treaty claims as ICSID's jurisdiction extends to claims that
arise both under investment treaties that originate under international law and commercial
agreements that originate under domestic law. See ICSID Convention art. 25, supra note 47, at
536. It might also understate investment claims by excluding treaty claims in other arbitral fora.
61. This could be remedied by posting the information on a Web page.
62. See infra notes 184-94, 301 and accompanying text. The author understands that
UNCTAD wishes to expand transparency related to its data and research, which would be useful.
63. In at least one instance, it appears that UNCTAD did include a dispute that did not arise
under an investment treaty. See infra note 139 (referring to CDC Group plc v. Republic of
Seychelles, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14 (Dec. 17, 2004), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CDC
vSeychellesAward_00I.pdf). While there is value in understanding the potential scope for
investor-state dispute resolution generally, one must be cautious about an over-generalization
between treaty-based claims and pure contract claims. This distinction matters because there is a
different cost/benefit calculus in establishing a right under a commercial agreement than there is
in negotiating an investment treaty, which arguably should play a role in: (i) determining the
rights and responsibilities under those different agreements, and (2) designing a dispute resolution
tailored to those different risks. See also infra notes 109, 139, 320 (discussing differences
between claims arising under treaties and national law).
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information about the data and methodology to support its conclusions
about investment treaty arbitration.'
III. METHODOLOGY FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION
Not an inconsiderable amount of ink has been spilled recently over the
quality of empirical legal scholarship.65 Commentators have expressed
concern over the failure of empirical researchers to explain "methodology"
or "research design. 66 The remainder of this section provides a transparent
explanation of how data was selected, gathered, and coded to aid its
credibility, reliability, and validity.
A. Selecting the Data: Publicly Available Arbitration Awards
1. Choosing the Unit of Analysis
The author conducted this quantitative research to provide a
descriptive baseline to guide future empirical work in this area.67 While it
would be a worthy undertaking to analyze the complete universe of
investment treaty disputes and the life cycles of those disputes, this project
had more modest goals.
In an effort to begin the process of empirically analyzing investment
treaty conflict, it focused on data that was readily available and of a
64. An "accurate description of the legal system can supply the information necessary for
sound policymaking." See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 665; see also Jennifer K. Robbennolt &
Christina A. Studebaker, News Media Reporting on Civil Litigation and Its Influence on Civil
Justice Decision Making, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 5, 5 (2003) (discussing the importance of
neutral and complete data).
65. See generally Lara CatA Backer, Defining, Measuring And Judging Scholarly
Productivity: Working Toward a Rigorous and Flexible Approach, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317
(2002); Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111
(2002); Frank Cross et al., Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
135 (2002); Eisenberg, supra note 50; Lee Epstein & Gary King, A Reply, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 191
(2002); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002); Jack
Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 153 (2002); Heise, supra note 50; Heise, supra note 52; Russell Korobkin, Emprirical
Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilities and Pitfalls, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1033 (2002);
Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83 N.C. L. REV. 167
(2004); Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169
(2002); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Empirical Research Methods: Using Empirical
Research in Law and Policy, 81 NEB. L. REV. 777 (2002).
66. See Epstein & King, supra note 65, at 38-40, 80-97, 99-114; Heise, supra note 50, at
834; Mitchell, supra note 65, at 177-87, 204; Robbennolt, supra note 65, at 779, 789-90.
67. See generally GARY KING, ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL
INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1994).
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reasonably large size-namely the population of arbitrations' with at least
one publicly available award.69  The subject of analysis7° was the
population of investment treaty arbitration awards7 that were publicly
available 72 before June 1, 2006. 7' Awards that were not publicly available
before then were excluded.74
68. Claims were based under bilateral treaties or multilateral investment treaties, like
NAFTA. Claims based on violation of national investment legislation were not included. If the
original claims were based upon an investment treaty but the tribunal found the treaty did not
apply, that award was included but further awards (i.e., awards on the merits) were omitted. Only
three cases exhibited this phenomenon: (1) CCL v. Kazakhstan, (2) Ceskoslovenska Obchodni
Banka v. Slovak Republic, and (3) Tradex Hellas v. Albania. Jurisdictional Award Rendered in
2003 in SCC Case 122/2001, 2005 STOCKHOLM INT'L ARB. REV. 123 (2005) [hereinafter CCL,
Jurisdiction]; Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4,
Decision on Jurisdiction (May 24, 1999) [hereinafter Ceskoslovenska, Jurisdiction], 14 ICSID
REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 251 (1999), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CSOB-Jurisdiction
1999.pdf; Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/94/2) (Apr. 29,
1999) 14 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 197 (1999), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/
tradexaward.pdf.
69. Having selected arbitration awards as the category of analysis, it was prudent to consider
different methods of analyzing awards. Under a "Westlaw" approach, researchers examine
published decisions in case reporters or an electronic repository of generally available
information. Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 84-85 (2007),
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=977802); see also Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, I J. EMP. L. STUD.
429, 429-430 (2004). Another option is the "Database" approach that uses a database managed
or controlled by a governmental agency. Moberly, supra, at 69; Laura Beth Nielson & Robert L.
Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a
Claiming System, 2005 WiS. L. REV. 663, 687-91 (2005) (analyzing statistics compiled by the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission). A third useful methodology
involves researchers gathering their own dataset from original sources for subsequent description
and analysis. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 125-27 (2002); Moberly, supra. This last approach was selected in part because there
was no "Westlaw"- like database. It was selected for its breadth and depth of analysis so it would
not limit the population of awards by institution and would gather all potentially relevant awards
for analysis.
70. While this research involves descriptive, quantitative data, a qualitative research
methodology may create contextualized data that describes the impact of individual variations
within the population. The author thanks Hari Osofsky for her insight on this point.
71. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text (defining "award" for the purposes of this
research).
72. See infra notes 76-78 (defining the scope of publicly available awards).
73. The earliest publicly available award was dated June 27, 1990. The latest award was
dated May 16, 2006. The author selected the cutoff date of June I for administrative convenience
to enable coding over the summer and permit discussions of coding methodology with the
University of Nebraska's Survey, Statistics, and Psychometrics Core Facility (SSP) on June 6,
2006.
74. Data on file with the North Carolina Law Review (listing publicly available cases on
June I, 2006). Theoretically, the population of publicly available awards is a subset of the
potentially larger population of all investment treaty arbitration awards. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that the population of all awards may not be significantly larger than the population of
publicly available awards. See infra notes 81-82, 84 and accompanying text.
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There is no single repository for investment treaty awards.75 Awards
in this population therefore came from three categories of sources: (1)
public Web sites,76 (2) an online database that charges a fee for access,"
and (3) print-based sources. 78  Awards were included irrespective of the
75. Unpublished decisions from U.S. state and federal courts might nevertheless be available
in online databases such as Westlaw or through freedom of information laws that permit citizens
to access court documents. See Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Basset, The End of Law, 84
B.U. L. REV. 1, 33 (2004) (observing that only appellate level "unpublished" decisions are
available from online databases). For investment treaty arbitration awards, such online databases
are the typical method of obtaining decisions. See infra note 77. Nevertheless, the lack of
transparency in investment treaty arbitration prevents citizens from accessing arbitration
documents. See Franck, supra note 3, at 87; John Ohnesorge, Chinese Administrative Law in
Northeast Asian Mirror, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 145-46 (2006) (describing
China's lack of a Freedom of Information law). But see DAVID BANISAR, PRIVACY INT'L,
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AROUND THE WORLD: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF ACCESS TO
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION LAWS (2006), available at http://www.privacyintemational.org/foi/
foisurvey2006.pdf (discussing countries with enacted or pending legislation about freedom of
information); Maria Dakolias, Are We There Yet?: Measuring Success of Constitutional Reform,
39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1150-51 (2006) (suggesting that more than sixty countries
around the world have Freedom of Information Laws).
76. The data was gathered from investment treaty awards available on three Web sites:
Investment Treaty Arbitration, Investment Treaty Claims and ICSID. See Investment Treaty
Arbitration, Chronological Listing, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/chronological-list.htm (last visited Nov.
27, 2007) [hereinafter ITA Web site]; Investment Claims, Orders and Awards,
http://www.investmentclaims.com/oal.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2007); ICSID, ICSID Cases:
On-Line Decisions and Awards, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm (last visited
Nov. 27, 2007). The author is unaware of other Web sites that systematically provide treaty
awards to the public. But see Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Dispute Settlement: NAFTA-Chapter 11-Investment, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/NAFTA-en.asp (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (providing access to documents related to
investment treaty cases arising under NAFTA); NAFTA Claims, Pleadings, Orders & Awards,
http://www.naftaclaims.comldisputes.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (same); U.S. Department of
State, NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations, http://www.state.gov/sl/c3439.htm (last visited Nov.
27, 2007) (same); Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Stockholm International Arbitration
Review, http://www.sccinstitute.com/uk/Publications (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (providing
access to some investment treaty cases rendered by the SCC). While the ITA Web site was the
initial source for awards, these awards were cross checked against what was available from public
Web sites, online databases, and other print-based sources.
77. Westlaw created a database, APPLETON-ISR, containing arbitration awards. Franck,
supra note 3, at 74 n. 105. The author had access to an Excel spreadsheet from Westlaw listing
the cases in its APPLETON-ISR database. One case in the population, IBM v. Ecuador, was
initially available only on APPLETON-ISR; after the author mentioned this gap on a professional
listserv, it became available on Investment Treaty Arbitration and Investment Claims. Email
from Susan D. Franck, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska Law College, to
OGEMID@JISCMAIL.AC.UK (May 18, 2006, 18:05) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). It is still unavailable on the ICSID Web site.
There was also a database on Klewer Arbitration, which was not searched given the large
license fee. After this Article was drafted, the author saw a reference suggesting LEXIS had a
database for investment treaty arbitration awards. Commission, supra note 51, at 136. The
author's conversations with LEXIS indicated such a database does not exist.
78. Two investment cases-identified as Nagel v. Czech Republic and CCL v. Kazakhstan-
were published initially in the Stockholm International Arbitration Review. Final Arbitral Award
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language in which they were written. Three awards were in Spanish79 and
four were in French;8° the remaining awards were in English.
As variables8 may affect the public availability of awards,82 focusing
on public awards may create a case selection bias. It cannot be known
whether the population of publicly available awards is a representative
subset of the population of all awards.83 One commentator claims "the
great majority of treaty awards are public."'  Meanwhile, practitioners,
arbitrators, and those affiliated with arbitral institutions have made
anecdotal comments that (1) there are only a "small" number of private
Rendered in 2003 in SCC Case 49/2002, 2004 STOCKHOLM ARB. REP. 141 (2004); CCL,
Jurisdiction, supra note 68. They are now both available on Investment Treaty Arbitration and
Investment Claims. Awards may also be available in hard copy in ICSID Reports, ICSID Review-
Foreign Investment Law Journal or International Legal Materials. See, e.g., Yaung Chi Oo
Trading PTE Ltd. v. Government of the Union of Myanmar, 42 I.L.M. 540 (2003).
79. Camuzzi International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/7, Decision
on Jurisdiction (June 10, 2005), http://www.investmentclaims.comldecisions/0%a%20%20%20
Camuzzi2jurisdiction.pdf; IBM World Trade Corp. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/10,
Decision on Jurisdiction (Dec. 22, 2003), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/IBMvsRDE.pdf
[hereinafter IBM, Jurisdiction]; Olguin v. Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction (Aug. 8, 2000), 18 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 133 (2003),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Endoro-Jurisdiction-Spanish.pdf (now available in English
translation at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Olgun-award-en.pdf).
80. Goetz v. Burundi, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3 (Feb. 10, 1999), 15 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN
INV. L.J. 454, 526 (2000), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Goetz-Award.pdf [hereinafter Goetz
Award]; Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, Final Award (Dec. 22,
2003), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ConsortiumRFCC-Award.pdf; Consortium Groupement
L.E.S.I.- DIPENTA v. Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/08, Award (Jan. 10, 2005),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/dipentav.algeria.pdf; Victor Pey Casado v. Chile, ICSID Case
No. ARB/98/2, Decision on Jurisdiction (May 8, 2002), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Victor
PeyCasadovChile-Jurisdiction-Partl.pdf.
81. Parties may agree or unilaterally elect to distribute awards. Arbitration practitioners
involved in "beauty parades" may distribute awards to promote their own practices. Arbitration
institutions may also create incentives that promote disclosure. The scope for liability for
improper disclosure is unclear, particularly where one party does not consent, and may depend
upon the applicable legal standards.
82. Certain governments may be subject to a Freedom of Information Act, which increases
the likelihood that they will consent to or must disclose an award. See supra note 75 (discussing
Freedom of Information legislation). Certain arbitral institutions have established practices that
may promote disclosure. For example, the SCC has a journal that has previously published
extracted versions of awards with identifying information removed. ICSID also has a historical
practice of award publication, and, particularly in light of the new Arbitration Rules that require
the publication of relevant extracts, ICSID awards are likely to enter the public domain. The
more challenging question is whether there are critical differences between awards from these
institutions and, for example, ad hoc awards. See infra note I 1l.
83. UNCTAD observed the "total number of treaty-based investment arbitrations is
impossible to measure" and the actual number of claims is "very likely larger than what is
known." UNCTAD, Review, supra note 59, at 5-6.
84. Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW, at viii
(2007). Van Harten, however, provides no empirical data to substantiate his claim.
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awards, and (2) older and more recent awards are now largely in the public
domain.85
If publicly available awards are representative, then there would be
better external validity and the conclusions drawn here may be of broader
applicability.86 Replicability and convergence of the research can address
this over time. Further research could do two things. First, research could
replicate the procedures in this study but include confidential as well as
publicly available awards. Second, it could determine whether publicly
available awards and nonpublicly available awards vary in any systematic
or substantive way.87 In the interim, this data is the best available
information.
2. Distinguishing Awards from Orders and Other Decisions
Scholars debate what distinguishes arbitration "awards" from
procedural orders or other decisions, such as those related to interim
measures or the confidentiality of the proceedings.88 Tribunals use the term
"award" in different manners.89 This study defined an "award" as a written
85. The author received these comments in passing. Other commentary seems to reflect this.
See Commission, supra note 5 1, at 136, 157 (suggesting that treaty awards are readily accessible
but failing to account for the impact of confidential awards).
86. The validity and reliability of these comments is untested, however. One listing of
arbitration awards includes both confidential and publicly available awards. See data on file with
the North Carolina Law Review. As of August 15, 2007, this meant that out of the 109 awards
made before June 1, 2006, only seven were unavailable. The public listing itself may be subject
to case selection bias. Nevertheless, it should provide a useful starting point to assess the external
validity of this research and aid in the replicability and convergence of research on investment
treaty arbitration.
87. It is not clear what the potential effect of a case selection bias is. Investors who win
have an incentive to disclose awards. For example, investors disclose awards because
shareholders may positively view the information that the investor has won a claim against a
government and created greater commercial certainty. Likewise, governments who win have a
similar incentive to disclose awards. Notifying the public that they have won a case may restore
confidence in the government or be of political utility. Moreover, governments may wish to
publicize disputes where tribunals find no violation of international law as it may promote the
confidence of other foreign investors in investing in that country. On balance, the selection effect
may be a wash. One area where this may not be the case is data related to which arbitral
institution is most likely to be used, since different institutions have different rules related to
confidentiality and the disclosure of awards.
88. Cindy Fazzi, Book Provides One-Stop Guidance in International Commercial
Arbitration, 61 Disp. RESOL. J. 88, 88 (2006) (acknowledging " '[w]hat constitutes an award is a
question with little international agreement. On the one extreme, there is a view that an award
must give a party damages or other redress; at the other extreme, there is a view that any decision
that finally decides an issue is an award''" (reviewing ANDREW TWEEDDALE & KEREN
TWEEDDALE, ARBITRATION OF COMMERCIAL DISPUTES: INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW
AND PRACTICE (2005))).
89. Compare Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, UNCITRAL, June 24, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 708, 730
(1999), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Ethyl-Award.pdf [hereinafter Ethyl Award] (calling a
jurisdictional determination an "award") with Maffezini v. Spain, ICSI) Case No. ARB/97/7
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opinion by an arbitration tribunal that made a binding decision9° on one or
more of the four substantive phases of a case,9' namely (1) jurisdiction, (2)
merits, (3) damages, or (4) allocation of costs. 92 Other interim orders and
decisions were omitted from the analysis.93 Likewise, other decisions-
from tribunals, ad hoc Annulment Committees, or national courts-were
excluded.94 Disputes with only a dispute notice or request for arbitration
were also omitted. Future analysis may consider this additional
information to provide a richer picture of investment treaty conflict and the
life cycle of disputes.
(Jan. 25, 2000), 16 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 212 (2001),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Maffezini-Jurisdiction-English-00O.pdf [hereinafter Maffezini
Award] (labeling a jurisdictional decision as a "decision"). This is particularly complex for
investment treaty arbitration because the ICSID Convention only permits final decisions to be
labeled as "awards." See ICSID Convention art. 48(3), supra note 47, at 540 (providing "the
award shall deal with every question submitted to the Tribunal, and shall state the reasons upon
which it is based"). As a result, many interim decisions at ICSID are labeled as "decisions." The
same limitations are not present in ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules or arbitration
at the SCC. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules art. 32(1), supra note 47, at 713 (observing that "[i]n
addition to making a final award, the arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to make interim,
interlocutory, or partial awards"); ARBITRATION RULES art. 38, at 14 (Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce, Arbitration Inst. 1999), http://www.sccinstitute.com/_upload/shared-files/regler/web
.A4-vanliga_2004 eng.pdf [hereinafter SCC Rules] (permitting tribunals to "decide a separate
issue or part of the dispute in a separate award").
90. Because they are technically final awards and may address disputed issues such as the
allocation of arbitration costs, awards embodying the parties' settlement agreements were defined
as "awards." There were only two awards embodying settlement agreements. Lemire Award,
supra note 48, and Goetz Award, supra note 80.
91. This definition means there may be several "awards" in a single case. Variables were
used to prevent cases from being counted twice. For example, the "NewCase" variable coded the
first award in a case with a "1." When analyzing which treaties were arbitrated, we selected only
new cases (SEL IF (NewCase EQ 1)) and analyzed the variable coding the arbitrated treaties
(FRE ApplicableTreatyl ).
92. This permitted analysis of each major phase at which the arbitration could terminate.
Failing to define an award in this manner could prevent analysis of a dispute's development and
its association with other phases. For example, it might fail to address cost-shifting
determinations that occur in multiple phases within a single case.
93. The ITA Web site refers to interim orders including: (1) requests for provisional
measures, (2) petitions for participation as amicus curiae, and (3) requests to determine the place
of arbitration. See ITA Web site, supra note 76; see also NAFTAClaims, www.naftaclaims.com
(last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (posting documents connected with NAFTA arbitration);
NAFTAClaims S.D. Myers, http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputesCanada_sdmyers.htm (last
visited Nov. 27, 2007) (posting orders from S.D. Myers v. Canada regarding "Respecting
Confidentiality" and "Crown Privilege"). None of these were included.
94. There are various actions that may occur after an award is rendered. A party may ask a
tribunal to interpret an award, correct an award, or issue a supplementary decision; and,
depending upon the type of investment treaty arbitration, a party may seek the aid of an ICSID ad
hoc Annulment Committee or a national court to challenge the award itself. See Franck, supra
note 2, at 1546-50 (describing different ways to contest awards); ITA Web site, supra note 76
(listing awards in Wena Hotels v. Egypt and Loewen v. U.S., for example, where parties sought
interpretation or supplementary decisions).
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B. Gathering the Data
After identifying the population, two research assistants extracted
information from the awards, including basic identifying information about
the case,95 members of the tribunal,96 party success, 97 damages quantified
and received, 98 and the costs of the arbitration. 99 Because case records were
95. This included the name of and parties in each case, the treaty under which the case was
rendered, the institution and/or rules under which the case was organized, the date of the award,
and references to paragraphs or pages of the award from which the information originated. The
author later went through each award and extracted a quotation about the investment sector that
was later coded.
96. This included the names of arbitrators and which arbitrator acted as a chair. The author
later went through each award and identified the following: whether it was possible to identify
which party had nominated the party-appointed arbitrators, which party nominated each arbitrator
(if applicable), the gender of each arbitrator (which was confirmed with a Google search), and the
nationality of each arbitrator (if available either in the award or in a Google search). This
information about arbitrators was gathered solely by the author.
97. This included information on the following: the award's title, whether the award was
final, whether jurisdictional issues were decided and the parties' success, whether the merits were
decided and the parties' success, whether damages were determined and the parties success,
whether costs were addressed, and whether there was a separate opinion. As a respondent, a
government has never been successful in bringing a counter-claim against an investor based upon
the information in this population; the only party with a coverable cause of action is a claimant.
98. These included determinations about the following: whether the award partially or fully
quantified damages, the amount of damages claimed in the original currency, and the amount of
damages awarded. The information about damages claimed was added after review of a study
related to attorneys' fees in class actions that suggested that the level of client recovery was the
most important determinant of attorney fee amounts. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 27, 28 (2004). The author later used a single Web site to convert the foreign currencies
into a U.S. dollar amount (using the date of the award as the relevant conversion date) to create a
common currency.
99. This included information about the following: (1) whether tribunals allocated the
parties' legal costs, (2) who was responsible for those costs and the applicable percentages and
financial obligations in the original currency, (3) the legal authority and rationale for the
tribunal's determinations about the parties' legal costs, (4) whether tribunals allocated the
tribunal's costs and expenses, (5) who was responsible for those costs and the applicable
percentages and financial obligations in the original currency, and (6) the legal authority and
rationale for the tribunal's decisions about its own costs and expenses. The same Web site was
used to convert foreign currencies. This list of factors is not exclusive. Future research might
also identify the time when cases are submitted to arbitration to determine the length of the time it
takes to secure an arbitral award.
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largely not publicly available,"° information came from the text of the
award.'0'
C. The Coding Process
The author drafted a code book to facilitate transparent, reliable, and
valid coding." There were two coders: the author and a research
assistant. 3 The two coders trained and coded a subset of cases to assess
intercoder reliability and revised the code book."° After coding four
subsets, intercoder reliability was 98.58%.'
°0
The author used a random numbers table"°I to randomize the awards.
Each coder coded all of the randomized awards. 0 7  Intercoder reliability
after coding was 97.5%.1"8 Where there were coding variations, coders
agreed upon an approach and amended the code book for future
replicability. The remainder of the Article provides quantitative and
descriptive analysis of the data.
100. Particularly for non-NAFTA cases, the underlying record is not publicly available. But
see NAFTACIaims, www.naftaclaims.com (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (disclosing some cases,
pleadings, and materials). Most arbitration rules require that the arbitration is confidential and
documents cannot be disclosed without the consent of both parties. ICSID Convention art. 48,
supra note 47, at 540 (requiring parties' consent for publication of the award); cf. UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules art. 25, supra note 47, at 711 (requiring hearings to "be held in camera unless
the parties agree otherwise"); id. art. 32, at 713 (requiring that the "award may be made public
only with the consent of both parties").
101. Exceptions were minor. First, for awards in Spanish or French,
http://babelfish.altavista.com was used as a translation device. Second, where awards were in a
foreign currency, a Web site was used to calculate the U.S. dollar equivalent. Third, the gender
and nationality of arbitrators were determined or verified through Google searches. Fourth, a
press release issued by Poland available on the Web in Eureko B. V.v. Poland was used to
interpret the underlying award.
102. The Code Book was revised after consulting with the Survey, Statistics, and
Psychometrics Core Facility at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
103. The assistant was a graduate of the University of Texas Law School who is currently a
Ph.D. candidate at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in biochemistry.
104. Vicki Piano Clark recommended use of a measure of reliability that was equal to the
total number of agreements divided by the total number of coding decisions. MATrHEW B.
MILES & A. MICHAEL HUBERMAN, QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 63 (2d ed. 1994).
Recognizing this might be viewed as a liberal measure, we required a high percentage of
reliability before proceeding.
105. The author has a document detailing each phase of this process that indicates which
cases were selected for initial reliability testing, selection methodology, the results of initial
coding, and changes made to coding procedures during this phase.
106. GEORGE W. SNEDECOR & WILLIAM G. COCHRAN, STATISTICAL METHODS 463-66,
tbl.A-I (7th ed. 1980).
107. Coders originally planned to only code half the awards. Since this was the first study of
its kind, out of an abundance of caution, both coders coded all awards.
108. The Excel spreadsheet containing the data had 10,812 data points. The coders agreed on
10,545 decisions and disagreed on 267 coding decisions.
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IV. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
AWARDS
This section offers descriptive, quantitative data about the population
of awards to contextualize assertions and assess attributive hypotheses
about investment treaty conflict. It provides basic information about the
parties and underlying disputes, the winners and losers, the financial
implications of the awards in terms of amounts awarded and arbitration
costs, the use of other forms of dispute resolution, and information about
the arbitrators.
A. Basic Information about the Population
The population of the study consisted of 102 awards.
1. Cases
For the purposes of this research, a "case" was a dispute submitted to
arbitration that spawned at least one award."'°
The 102 awards came from eighty-two separate cases. Seventeen
cases spawned multiple awards. There were sixty-five cases with one
award, fifteen cases with two awards, and one case with three awards.
Only one case-Pope & Talbot v. Canada-had four awards separately
addressing jurisdiction, merits, damages, and costs.
2. Final Awards
Of the 102 awards, fifty-two awards-more than 50% of the
population" ° -finally resolved the case's treaty claims."l '
109. For the purposes of providing context, it is useful to observe that UNCTAD's recently
released database of "known cases" suggests that there were approximately 255 cases by the end
of November 2006. UNCTAD Database of Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Settlement,
available at http://www.unctad.org/iia-dbcases/search.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 2007). This
database of "known cases" appears to include investor-state disputes for which there is public
information. This appears to include cases arising under investment treaty disputes arising under
international law as well as ordinary commercial disputes under domestic law involving a state
entity. The known cases database also appears to include cases, for example, where disputes
were articulated (but proceedings never commenced and sometimes the investor is not even
known), cases where an arbitration is pending, and concluded cases (irrespective of whether they
resulted in an award). See also supra notes 68-87 and accompanying text (addressing the limited
nature of the population and the possible limitations on the data's generalizability).
110. The remaining fifty awards did not finally resolve the case's treaty claims. As of June 1,
2006, the cases were either ongoing, settled, or discontinued.
I 11. Using the number of final awards, forty-nine were final and fifty-three awards were non-
final. This measure does not address those non-final arbitration awards that finally resolve
investors' investment treaty claims, such as Ceskoslovensk Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovak
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Final Award (Dec. 29, 2004), http://www.worldbank.org
/icsid/cases/czechpo2.pdf, CCL v. Rep. of Kazakhstan, SCC Case No. 122/201 (Dec. 31, 2005),
[Vol. 86
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
The fifty-two treaty claims became final at different phases of the
arbitration process. Three awards finally adjudicated treaty claims after
addressing only jurisdiction; nine awards were final after addressing both
jurisdiction and costs; fifteen awards were final after addressing
jurisdiction, merits, and costs; fourteen were final after having addressed
jurisdiction, merits, damages, and costs; two were final after addressing the
merits and costs; four were final after having addressed merits, damages,
and costs; one award was final after having addressed only damages and
costs; and four awards only addressed cost issues."'
The data from these fifty-two awards suggests that there were two
patterns in how tribunals managed their cases." 3 First, tribunals were
willing to bifurcate proceedings and separately address issues related to
jurisdiction and merits/damages. This would account for the twelve awards
that focused primarily on jurisdictional issues and the seven that addressed
issues focusing on merits and/or damages. The second pattern relates to
holding consolidated proceedings to deal with all the issues of the case in a
single process. This might appear to be the more popular approach of
tribunals as the two most frequent combinations (jurisdiction, merits, and
costs: n=15; and jurisdiction, merits, damages, and costs: n=14), occurred
a total of twenty-nine times. These different approaches may result in the
need for additional time and money to resolve the dispute, but there is also
the possibility that bifurcation could create efficiencies.114
Future research may consider issues of case management-
particularly as ICSID recently amended its rules to permit preliminary
objections to jurisdiction' 5 -to determine the costs and efficacy of
different approaches. Such information could be used in various ways.
First, governments may wish to design their dispute resolution systems to
require or encourage case management strategies that are likely to decrease
I Stockholm Int. Arb. Rev. 123, http://www.investmentclaims.comdecisions/CCL-Kazakhstan-
Final_Award.pdf, and Tradex Hellas v. Albania (ICS1D Case No. ARB/94/2, Award, 197, 249
(Apr. 29, 1999), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/tradex-award.pdf. This accounts for the
difference between final awards and awards finally resolving treaty claims.
112. Overall, forty-nine of these cases involved a cost determination. Two awards from S.D.
Myers, Inc. v. Canada, supra note 93, and Pope & Talbot only addressed costs; and the two
settlement agreements, Lemire, Lemire Award, supra note 48, at 541, and Goetz, Goetz Award,
supra note 80, at 456, only had decisions related to costs.
113. Although the unit of analysis contains fifty-two data points, as the breakdowns in
categories are small, care should be taken when drawing inferences.
114. Future research also might consider whether there is a difference in the arbitration costs
for bifurcated versus non-bifurcated proceedings.
115. ICSID, ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules: Rules of Procedure for Conciliation
Proceedings R.29 (2006) [hereinafter ICSID Arbitration Rules], available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm. One might consider analyzing whether
cases with multiple or single phases are likely to favor a particular party.
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the time and cost of dispute resolution. 16  Second, parties may use or
advocate use of case management strategies most likely to lead to the cost-
efficient administration of the dispute." 7 Third, tribunals may wish to
consider the financial impact of their decision to bifurcate or combine
proceedings.118
B. Claim #1: Are Investors from Developed Countries Subjecting
Developing States to Investment Arbitration?
There are questions about who are the subjects and objects of
investment treaty arbitration. At present, there are few public claims about
who the parties are and what is arbitrated. There have been anecdotal
assertions that investors come from the developed world and that the
developing world is unduly burdened by investment treaty arbitration." 9
To evaluate the veracity of these claims, this section offers data about (a)
who were the parties to the arbitrations, (b) what treaties were arbitrated,
(c) where claims were brought, and (d) in which sectors arbitrations arose.
1. Parties to the Cases: Investors and Governments
a. Investors
While treaties define the term in different ways, an "investor" is
typically an individual or corporate entity. 2 ° Information about investor
nationality indicates who is participating in the arbitrations and which
home governments have arguably benefited from investment treaties.'
2'
116. Although the author is unaware whether its action was based upon empirical analysis,
the United States has taken steps in this regard. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 15, art.
28(4)-(7) (giving tribunals authority to decide certain objections as a "preliminary question").
117. There may be strategic advantages to extending the time and cost of arbitrating claims.
Not all parties will have the same incentive to use empirical evidence to promote cost-efficient
case management.
118. Decisions may be based on many criteria. Tribunals may determine that unique legal or
factual issues of the dispute are pertinent and may therefore be less concerned with efficiency.
119. ANDERSON AND GRUSKY, supra note 6, at 5, 10-19.
120. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 27, at 31-41; see also 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note
15, art. 1, 4 (defining an "investor of a Party" as "a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national
or an enterprise of a Party, that attempts to make, is making, or has made an investment in the
territory of the other party; provided, however, that a natural person who is a dual national shall
be deemed to be exclusively a national of the State of his/her dominant and effective
nationality").
121. With its nationals investing abroad, home governments of those investors presumably
obtain benefits. The benefits might involve, for example, greater economic, cultural, and political
integration between the two countries. It may also create economically healthy domestic
enterprises that may be able to contribute more to the economic health of the home government.
Because the opportunity for multinational companies to lower their worldwide tax burdens (for
example through deferral and transfer pricing) increases with the breadth of their global
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UNCTAD has not analyzed investor nationality. The author is unaware of
other research that gathers and describes investor nationality.
The eighty-two cases encompassed a total of 107 investors from
twenty-three different countries. 22 There were approximately 1.3 investors
in each case, which means that cases tended to involve more than one
investor. The maximum number of investors in a single case was five.
2
1
The largest number of investors came from the United States, with
forty-five investors making claims in thirty-two different cases. Other
countries with large numbers of investors filing claims were Canada (seven
investors in six cases), Italy (eight investors in six cases), the Netherlands
(five investors in five cases), the United Kingdom (five investors in five
cases), Spain (six investors in four cases), and France (five investors in
three cases). There were also cases initiated by investors from transitioning
economies, such as the Russian Federation, Malaysia, Turkey, Peru,
Lithuania, and the Czech Republic (See Table 1).
operations, investment abroad does not generally improve a nation's ability to tax its resident
companies. However, transnational efforts at the OECD toward information exchange and
uniformity in transfer pricing methods could alter this result and enhance the ability of home
governments to enforce their tax systems with respect to these companies. The author is grateful
to Professor Allison Christians for her thoughts on this issue.
122. Given that there are approximately 175 signatory countries to investment treaties, this
finding is interesting. Future research might consider why investors from particular countries are
represented more and why others less so.
123. Champion Trading Co. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9, Decision on Jurisdiction, at
3 (Nov. 1I, 2007), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/champion-decision.pdf.
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Table 1: Number of Cases where Investor(s) Claimed to be a National of
the Country vs. Number of Investors Claiming to be a National of the
Country for All Cases











































































Note: * = Member States from the OECD.1 25
"124. The reference to eighty-three cases reflects that in one of the eighty-two cases, there
were investors from two countries. See infra note 160.
125. The OECD Member States are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
OECD, Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, http://www.oecd.




The data shows that investors from twenty-three different countries
made claims under investment treaties. This was a somewhat small
proportion considering that more than 175 countries have signed
investment treaties.
26
Investors making claims predominantly hailed from developed states.
The United States had the largest number of investors making such claims,
but countries such as Italy, Canada, Spain, France, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom also had large numbers of investors. Out of the 107 total
investors, ninety-five (88.9%) investors were from OECD countries.
Coding investors' country of origin by the World Bank's country
classification system 27 yielded similar results. Nearly 90% of claims were
brought from investors in "high income" countries. 128 Interestingly, there
were no investors from "low income" countries as defined by the World
Bank or from LDCs 1 9 as defined by the United Nations.
The author is unaware of scholarship that provides a baseline for the
expected levels of investor participation in treaty arbitration. 31 It is
126. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
127. Data is available in a spreadsheet from the World Bank that classifies economies as: (1)
High Income from OECD and non-OECD countries, (2) Upper Middle Income, (3) Lower
Middle Income, and (4) Low Income. World Bank, Data and Statistics, Country Classification,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNALDATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20420458
-menuPK:64133156-pagePK:64133150-piPK:64133175-theSitePK:239419,00.html (last visited
Nov. 10, 2007). The World Bank's main criterion for classifying economies is gross national
income (GNI) per capita. Id.
128. Of the 107 investors, ninety-six were from "high income" countries, ten were from
"upper middle income" countries, and only one investor was from a "lower-middle" income
country.
129. The United Nations has an official list of Least Developed Countries ("LDCs") that
includes Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati,
the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sdo Tom6 and Principe,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda,
the United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen, and Zambia. See Landlocked Developing
Countries and Small Island Developing States, http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm
(last visited Nov. 10, 2007); U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., UN List of LDCs After the
2006 Triennial Review, http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.aspintltemlD=364 l&lang=l (last
visited Nov. 10, 2007). The criteria for defining an LDC relates to (1) low income based upon
gross domestic product, (2) human resource weakness criterion that considers factors related to
nutrition, health, education, and adult literacy, and (3) economic vulnerability related to factors
such as instability of agricultural production, exports of goods and services and merchandise
export concentration. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., What Are the Least Developed
Countries: The Criteria, http://www.un.orglgeninfo/faq/factsheets/FS20_HTM (last visited Nov.
27, 2007).
130. This may be due to the relatively recent nature of the investor-state dispute resolution
mechanism in investment treaties and the resulting gaps in academic literature.
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therefore difficult to assess whether or not investors from the developed
world use arbitration appropriately or disproportionately.
High levels of claims by OECD investors and investors from "high
income" countries may not be completely unexpected. OECD countries
historically have had more active investment treaty programs.' They also
have had high foreign investment flows.'32 It is plausible that high levels of
foreign investment are positively correlated with more investment
disputes.'33 Further research on the relationship between investment levels
and the incidence of investment disputes is desirable.
Other variables may also explain the prevalence of claimants from
OECD or "high income" countries. For example, investors from non-
OECD and/or "lower income" countries may not have the same level of
investments abroad. They may also lack the financial or legal resources to
pursue claims. In some cases, the value of investments from these
countries may not justify the expenditure of resources to resolve the dispute
through arbitration.'34 Cultural differences may also predispose investors
from certain backgrounds to forego arbitration in favor of other forms of
dispute resolution.'35 Future research might usefully consider these
phenomena to evaluate whether investors from OECD and "high income"
131. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., South-South Cooperation in International
Investment Agreements, 5-16, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IT/2005/3 (2005) [hereinafter
UNCTAD, South-South Cooperation], available at http:llwww.unctad.org/en/docs/
iteiit20053 en.pdf; see also Press Release, U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., South-South
Investment Agreements Proliferating, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/PRESSPR/2004/036 (Nov. 23,
2004), available at http://www.unctad.org/templates/
webflyer.asp?docid=5637&intltemlD=2807&lang=l (describing the recent growth trends in the
development of BITs).
132. For OECD countries, foreign investment was US$622 billion in 2005. OECD,
International Investment Perspectives 15 (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/
58/37010986.pdf (prepared by Hans Christiansen and Ayse Bertrand). But see U.N. Conference
on Trade and Dev., World Investment Report 2006: FDI from Developing and Transition
Economies: Implications for Development, at xvii, http://www.unctad.org/enldocs/wir
2006_en.pdf (suggesting that the level of FDI in 2005 was US$916 billion but noting the peak in
2000 was US$1.4 trillion).
133. See UNCTAD, Disputes on the Rise, supra note 59, at 5 ("More investment may lead to
more occasions for disputes-and more occasions for disputes combined with more [investment
treaties] are likely to lead to more cases.").
134. For example, if average investments in Costa Rica are US$1 million but it costs twice
that much to arbitrate, other dispute resolution methods may be more cost-effective. Small level
investments in developed countries may not be arbitrated for similar reasons.
135. Certain countries such as China, for example, are noted for their historical preference for
non-adversarial types of dispute resolution. There were no Chinese investors in the population.
While historical approaches to dispute resolution may affect the decision of Chinese investors to
arbitrate, the availability and scope of procedural rights and extent of investment flows may also
affect the decision. Jun Ge, Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation: Dispute Resolution in the
People's Republic of China, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 122, 123 (1996).
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countries are overrepresented in the population of investment treaty
claimants.
b. Respondent Governments
UNCTAD's data suggests that governments in both the developed and
developing world must defend claims.' 36 In 2005, UNCTAD explained
"[a]t least 61 governments-37 of them in the developing world, 14 in
developed countries, and 10 in Southeast Europe and the Commonwealth
of Independent States-have faced investment treaty arbitration.' 37  In
slight contrast, research from a non-governmental organization ("NGO")
suggests that developing countries were 93% of the respondents.'38 As
research methodology from those projects raises concerns, 3 9 this research
attempts to address methodological concerns to aid assessment of the
research conclusions.
In each of the eighty-two cases, the investor(s) filed a single
arbitration to sue a government respondent. Similar to the UNCTAD
data, 40 there were thirty-seven different respondents in the eighty-two
cases. The average number of claims against each country was 2.22,14' and
the maximum number of cases was the fifteen filed against Argentina (See
Appendix 1).
136. UNCTAD, 2005 HA Monitor No. 4, supra note 59, at 3-4, 9-10; UNCTAD, 2006 IIA
Monitor No. 4, supra note 59, at 2-3, 12-13; UNCTAD, Review, supra note 59, at 69-70.
137. UNCTAD, Review, supra note 59, at 6; see also UNCTAD, 2005 H1A Monitor No. 4,
supra note 59, at 3.
138. Press Release, Food and Water Watch, World Bank Court Grants Power to Corporations
(Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/press/releases/world-bank-court-grants-
power-to-corporations-articlel2302007 [hereinafter IPS & FWW Press Release]. The report
suggests that 74% of ICSID's pending and concluded cases are against "middle-income"
developing countries and 19% of concluded and pending cases are against "low-income"
developing countries. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 6, at ix. The research has
methodological difficulties similar to UNCTAD's work. It does not explain its unit of analysis or
research methodology clearly.
139. UNCTAD purports to report the "known investment treaty arbitrations" and identifies
countries that "have faced investment treaty arbitration." It then lists the Seychelles as a country
subjected to investment treaty arbitration. UNCTAD, 2006 HA Monitor No. 4, supra note 59, at
3-4. UNCTAD's Web site indicates that the only case against the Seychelles is not an
investment arbitration. See UNCTAD Database of Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute
Settlement Cases, http://www.unctad.org/iia-dbcases/search.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2007)
(enter "Seychelles" in the "Country involved" field; then click on "Search"). Instead, it is a
commercial case governed by English law (not an investment treaty). CDC Group plc v.
Seychelles, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, Award (Dec. 17, 2004),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CDCvSeychellesAward_00 I.pdf; see also supra note 63
(discussing problems with distinguishing between treaty-based claims and pure contract claims).
140. UNCTAD data included almost twice the number of countries, but this difference results
from their measuring submitted cases, not cases with arbitration awards. The breadth of the
countries subject to arbitration was not dissimilar.
141. The mode of government respondents was one.
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In contrast to the findings about investors, OECD countries do not
dominate the list of government respondents. Rather, only twenty-five
(30.5%) of the government respondents were OECD countries. This was
somewhat similar to UNCTAD's findings that fourteen out of sixty-one
respondents (22.9%) were developed countries. 4 2 While OECD countries
were not the majority of respondents, they faced numerous cases.
Specifically, there were nine cases against Mexico, as well as four cases
against Canada, the Czech Republic, and the United States respectively.
This suggests that the developing world is not the only group subjected to
the risk of resolving investment treaty disputes. 1
4 3
The results of the present study contradict a finding reported by an
NGO that only 7% of cases were against nondeveloping countries.'
Using the World Bank classification system, 18% (n=15) of respondent
states were "high income" countries;'45 45% (n=37) were "upper middle
income" countries;'4 6  28% (n=23) from "lower middle income"
countries; 147 and only 8.5% (n=7) were "low income" countries. 148 This
suggests that "middle income" countries, particularly those with a higher
income, were at the greatest risk of arbitration.1 49 While it is not clear what
contributes to this phenomenon, one might postulate that higher levels of
investments or more risky investments may be relevant variables that make
142. This difference may result, for example, in the different categories of analysis as OECD
countries are not necessarily the same as "developed" countries.
143. This might, for example, take the form of countries such as Argentina, the United States,
or a more prototypical country subjected to treaty claims. There were also, however, multiple
claims against non-OECD countries such as Pakistan and Ukraine.
144. This may be due to the lack of clarity as to the NGO's methodology. The title of the
Anderson & Grusky report suggests that they are focusing on ICSID cases, but it is not clear
whether they included non-ICSID cases and/or limited their analysis to investment treaty
disputes. See ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 6. In addition, the report came out before the
most recent (July 2007) World Bank Classifications, which formed the basis of analysis in this
research. This may have made a slight difference as countries such as the Czech Republic and
Estonia moved from "upper middle income" to "high income" countries.
145. The respondent states were Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain, the United Arab
Emirates, and the United States.
146. The governments were Argentina, Bulgaria, Chile, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Malaysia,
Mexico, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Turkey, and Venezuela.
147. The governments were Albania, Bolivia, Ecuador, Egypt, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco,
Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine.
148. These were Burundi, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Zaire (now the Democratic
Republic of the Congo).
149. While the numbers are relatively small, the data suggested that as income levels
increased, so did the number of overall and average number of cases against a country. To the
extent that higher income levels are associated with higher investment levels, this may provide
support for the theory that disputes tend to follow capital. The rough parity between the average
numbers of claims against "upper-middle" and "high income" countries also suggests that there




countries more susceptible to disputes. Future research should assess the
relationships.
There was also interesting data about arbitrations with LDCs. Only
three of the cases-or 3.7% of the population-involved LDCs, namely
Burundi, Myanmar and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo).
Each of these governments was involved in only one case. As coding using
World Bank definitions means that only 8.5% of governments were "low
income," the NGO claim that 19% of cases are against "low income"
countries overstates the point.'5° While the data demonstrated that even the
most vulnerable economies were subjected to treaty disputes, the relatively
limited number of such cases is encouraging.' 5 ' From a development
perspective, it is useful to know that LDCs face a risk but perhaps not an
undue burden of arbitrating disputes. Moreover, it is noteworthy that
OECD countries faced a higher percentage of claims than LDCs, even
though there are more LCDs than OECD member states. Future analysis
might assess the role of other variables in order to further contextualize
these findings. Given the lack of an available baseline, it would be useful
to assess whether particular governments are subject to a disproportionate
number of claims, bearing in mind the number of investment treaties, the
levels of international investment, and indicators of good governance.
With this information, an informed assessment might be made as to
whether the investment treaty system and its dispute resolution mechanism
benefit the developed or developing countries in a disproportionate manner.
c. Symmetry of Investment Treaty Arbitration
There have been critiques that investment treaties may be bilateral in
theory but unilateral in effect, and thus foster inequality that stifles
sustainable development. Although he acknowledges this may not always
be the case, Professor William Dodge suggests that investment treaties "are
reciprocal in theory but not in fact, for it is generally only the less
developed country that bears the risk of being sued."' This point is
150. Again, the difference in these figures may be a caused by a difference in methodological
approach. The NGO did not explain its unit of analysis, for example, and the methodology
appears to focus on World Bank definitions of "low income developing countries" rather than UN
definitions for LCDs. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 6, at ix, 33. Data is available in a
spreadsheet from the World Bank that classifies economies as (1) High Income from OECD and
non-OECD countries, (2) Upper Middle Income, (3) Lower Middle Income, and (4) Low Income.
See supra note 127.
151. It would also be useful to consider how many investment treaties involve LDCs and
what the capital inflows are to LDCs that have treaties. If, for example, there were a large
number of claims against LDCs that had a small number of treaties and/or a small flow of foreign
investment, this may suggest that LDCs are disparately impacted by investment treaty arbitration.
152. Dodge, supra note 29, at 3; see also Alvarez & Park, supra note 60, at 368-70
(commenting on double standards in investment arbitration).
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important for treaty negotiators considering the costs and benefits of
entering into treaties and providing foreign investors with treaty rights.'53
There was some evidence that treaty arbitration exhibited symmetry in
both theory and practice. Ten countries-namely Argentina, Canada,
Chile, the Czech Republic, Malaysia, Peru, Russia, Spain, Turkey, and the
United States-had investors with claims against host governments.
Meanwhile, these same governments were also respondents in investment
treaty arbitration (See Table 2).
Table 2: Number of Cases Where Government's Investors Arbitrated an
Investment Treaty Claim Against Another Government vs. Number of Cases
Where Government Was a Respondent State
Country Cases Brought by Investors Cases as Respondent










United States 32 4
To put this data in context, it is useful to consider two points. First,
there were fifty countries that either had an investor bring a claim or had
been subject to a claim themselves. Only ten out of fifty (20%) of the
states had both investors and respondents involved in investment treaty
arbitration. The United States and Spain had more investors initiating
investment disputes whereas other states (like Argentina and the Czech
Republic) had more disputes lodged against them. Second, as the numbers
are small, inferences should be made with caution and future research may
reveal different patterns.
Overall, the data appears to support Professor Dodge's attributive
hypothesis that the treaties are "reciprocal in theory but not in fact.'
54
153. One might also suggest that different countries may have varying interests in aspects of
these benefits. Theoretically, the point of entering treaties for developing countries is not to
receive reciprocal rights but to stimulate investment.
154. Dodge, supra note 29, at 3.
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Less than a quarter of governments found themselves both the subject (via
their investors) and object (as a respondent) of investment treaty
arbitration. Rather, states tended to experience the unilateral utilization of
dispute resolution where they were either a respondent state or the home
state of an investor.
While the actual risks and benefits of dispute resolution did not flow
in a bilateral direction, this does not mean that investment treaties are
unbalanced instruments per se. The current findings may be the result of
the historical evolution of investment treaties and capital flows. Investment
treaties were initially between primarily capital importing and capital
exporting countries. 155 Future analysis should look for relationships among
the level of treaty disputes, the number of investment treaties and the level
of foreign investment. As the number of investment treaties between
developing countries increases and investment flows expand, new patterns
may emerge. 56
The lack of symmetry in the use of investment treaty arbitration does
not necessarily mean that treaties stifle sustainable development. The data
may implicate whether the cost of entering investment treaties is worth the
development benefit. Overemphasizing one disparity fails to address a
fundamental point: it is possible that countries obtained the purported
benefits of investment treaties (namely increased investment flows or an
increased probability of foreign investment)'57 but were not actually
subjected to investment treaty arbitration. Without a more systematic
analysis of the benefits of investment treaties, it is not yet appropriate to
conclude that an imbalance in the utilization of dispute resolution stifles
economic development, let alone sustainable development. Further
research is therefore warranted.
155. See UNCTAD, South-South Cooperation, supra note 131, at 9-10, 19-20, 26-27;
VANDEVELDE, supra note 42.
156. For example, as large importers of foreign capital with active investment treaty
programs, the United States and Canada have been subjected to investment treaty claims.
Notably, the United States and Canada are signatories to NAFTA, which permits arbitration
between two developed countries. Other developed nations with active investment treaty
programs, such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, do not follow this pattern. This may
be because they have primarily reached out to transitional and developing economies. See
UNCTAD, Investment Instruments Online, Bilateral Investment Treaties,
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?id=779 (select the desired country from the
drop down menu accompanying "between"; then click submit) (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
157. Franck, supra note II (discussing the literature analyzing whether investment treaties
increase levels of foreign investment).
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2. Arbitrated Treaties
The author is unaware of any research describing which treaties are
subject to arbitration. The present data suggests that, in practice,
arbitration occurs in only a fraction of the world's investment treaties. In
the eighty-two cases, there were claims under forty-nine treaties. As there
are approximately 1,700 in force,'58 forty-nine was a small segment of the
population of potentially arbitrable treaties. Most treaties spawned only
one case. Thirty-eight treaties (77.6%) involved a single case. The
remaining eleven treaties were subjected to multiple arbitrations. NAFTA
was the most heavily arbitrated treaty and accounted for 20% of the cases
(n=16). The second most heavily arbitrated treaty was the Argentina-
United States investment treaty with eight different cases (7%). Other
highlights involve three cases under the Argentina-France BIT, three cases
under the Argentina-Spain BIT, and three cases under the Energy Charter
Treaty. Other treaties subjected to repeat litigation were the Argentina-
Belgo Luxeumborg Economic Union BIT (n=2), Italy-Morocco BIT (n=2),
Netherlands-Czech and Slovak Federal Republic BIT (n=2), United
Kingdom-Egypt BIT (n=2), and the United States-Ukraine BIT (n=2)
159
(See Chart 1).








5 n =' n l _1_n= -
0
One Case Two Cases Three Cases Eight Cases (US- Sixteen Cases
Argentina BIT) (NAFTA)
Number of Cases Brought Under Treaty
Chart 1: Frequency breakdown of investment treaties subject to arbitration
showing that treaties were involved in only one case (n=38), in three cases (n=3),
eight cases (n= 1), and sixteen cases (n= 1).
158. See Houde, supra note 25, at 143--44.
159. Multiple investors have sued Argentina as a result of its currency crisis. UNCTAD,




Eighty-one of the eighty-two cases involved a claim under a single
investment treaty. Only one case, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de
Barcelona S.A. v. Argentina,"° involved simultaneous arbitration of two
treaties. Multiple investors bringing a single case demonstrates that
investors can self-select to consolidate treaty claims. Other evidence, such
as inconsistent decisions in Lauder and CME, 16' indicates this may not
always be the case. In the future, designers of dispute resolution systems
might consider creating incentives for investors to consolidate claims that
would otherwise lead to inconsistent results on similar issues of law and
fact. Otherwise, governments may consider creating provisions that
provide them with a right to consolidate proceedings.
62
These demographics provide a context for understanding the relative
arbitration risk for different treaties. The large number of treaties in force
that were not subject to arbitration may suggest that investment treaty
arbitration is not as prevalent as it has the potential to be. It also means that
when treaties are involved in multiple arbitrations, government officials
preparing to renegotiate investment treaties nearing expiration 161 may wish
160. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios
Integrales del Agua S.A. v. Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17,
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Suez-Jurisdiction.pdf (May 6, 2006). This claim was brought
under the Argentina-France and Argentina-Spain investment treaties. Id.
161. Franck, supra note 2, 1559-68.
162. This might be done, for example, by including a consolidation clause in treaties or
creating a multi-national claim tribunal in case there are multiple cases from a similar government
conduct that implicates multiple investors and/or multiple treaties. There are downsides to this
approach, however. For example, such consolidation may cause difficulties as to the
enforceability of the dispute resolution mechanism and/or the enforceability of an award. Martin
Bartels, Multiparty Arbitration Clauses, 2 J. INT'L ARB. 61, 62 (1985); Philippe Leboulanger,
Multi-Contract Arbitration, 13 J. INT'L ARB. 43, 64 (1996); Irene M. Ten Cate, Multi-Party and
Multi-Contract Arbitrations: Procedural Mechanisms and Interpretation of Arbitration
Agreements Under U.S. Law, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 133, 138 (2004). Similarly, such a
provision may not catch all the relevant disputes if such consolidation clauses do not appear in
applicable treaties. See, e.g., United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1993)
(ruling that the "district court cannot consolidate arbitration proceedings arising from separate
agreements to arbitrate, absent the parties' agreement to allow such consolidation"). This may,
however, be a matter of the applicable law and/or the law of the arbitration forum. But see Rona
G. Shamoon & Irene M. Ten Cate, Absence of Consent Trumps Arbitral Economy: Consolidation
of Arbitrations Under U.S. Law, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 335, 335 (2001) (suggesting that the
U.S. may be "unlikely to compel consolidation" without party agreement or authority in the
applicable law or arbitration rules and noting the uncertainty of a court's "power to order
consolidation in the face of a party's objection, even where there is a statutory basis for
consolidation").
163. Many treaties currently in existence have sunset provisions that provide an opportunity
for renegotiation of treaty terms. COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 38, at 109; LUCY REED ET
AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 61-62 (2004). UNCTAD has suggested the number of treaty
renegotiations is on the rise. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Recent Developments in
International Investment Agreements, 6, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD UNCTADIWEB/ITEJIIT/2005/I
(Aug. 30, 2005), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiit2005 l-en.pdf.
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to reconsider how best to revise treaties to secure the benefits of foreign
investment while minimizing exposure to unnecessary arbitration risk.
This might, for example, involve clarifying substantive investment rights
and providing particularized rules about government conduct that creates
liability. Given the number of its treaties involved in arbitration,
Argentina, for example, might wish to consider these findings. In any
event, countries may also decide that the risk of any arbitration is too much
and may decline to offer investment treaty arbitration or opt for a different
form of dispute resolution. Otherwise, they may simply decline to extend
the treaty when it comes up for renewal. 'I
3. Arbitral Institutions and Rules
In its 2006 International Investment Agreements ("IIA") Monitor,
UNCTAD describes where investors brought claims. Using a different
methodology than the one described in this Article, UNCTAD stated that
out of 255 "known treaty-based cases," 156 were with ICSID or its
Additional Facility, sixty-five were under the UNCITRAL Rules, eighteen
under the SCC, four under the International Chamber of Commerce
("ICC"), four were ad hoc, one was at the Cairo Regional Centre for
International Commercial Arbitration, and seven cases were without a
known venue.
165
UNCTAD has not yet clearly distinguished between institutional and
ad hoc arbitration. Nor has it reported under which rules the cases
proceeded. This matters, as an institution can administer disputes under
different rules, 16 6 and ad hoc arbitrations may apply institutional rules, as in
Yaung Chi Oo Trading PTE Ltd. v. Myanmar,167 where an ad hoc "Tribunal
decided to apply, mutatis mutandis, the Arbitration (Additional Facility)
Rules of the [ICSID]."168 By contrast, this research explicitly distinguishes
164. Ecuador has apparently decided to pursue the strategy of non-renewal. See Reuters,
Ecuador Says Won't Extend U.S. Investment Treaty, May 6, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSN0626423520070507 (quoting the Ecuadorian
Foreign Minister as saying the U.S.-Ecuador BIT " 'has caused our country a lot of problems ...
[and] doesn't represent our national interests' ").
165. UNCTAD, 2006 HA Monitor No. 4, supra note 59, at 2.
166. ICSID lets cases proceed under either the ICSID or ICSID-Additional Facility Rules.
The SCC permits cases to be brought under its rules or the UNCITRAL rules. Arbitration
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, http://www.sccinstitute.comluk/home/ (last
visited Nov. 27, 2007); International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
167. Yaung Chi Oo Trading PTE Ltd. v. Government of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN I.D.
Case No. ARB/01/1 (Mar. 31, 2003), 42 I.L.M. 540 (2003).
168. This was the only case in the population that did so. Id. at 540. The International Court
of Justice acted as the appointing authority in this case. Id.
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between (1) institutional versus ad hoc arbitration, and (2) the rules
applicable to that arbitration.
Out of the eighty-two cases, sixty-five (79.3%) were institutional'69
and seventeen (20.7%) were ad hoc. Consistent with UNCTAD's findings,
there is an apparent preference for institutional arbitration, which is
potentially due to the support it provides. 7 ' A further breakdown indicates
there were sixty cases (73.2%) proceeding at ICSID, five cases (6.1%) at
the SCC, and the remaining seventeen cases (20.7%) were ad hoc (See
Chart 2). In contrast to UNCTAD's findings, there were no cases at the
ICC or other arbitral institutions.' 7'









Chart 2: Frequency and percentage of cases in institutional or ad hoc
arbitration demonstrating that ICSID cases account for 73% (n=60),
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) cases account for 6% (n=5) and
the remaining 21% (n= 17) are ad hoc arbitrations.
169. The Code Book describes how institutions (like ICSID and LCIA) provide
administrative support to ad hoc proceedings (for example, providing a hearing room, financial
administration, the provision of a secretary or acting as an appointing authority). For coding
purposes, support did not transform ad hoc arbitration into "institutional" because it was not
conducted according to institutional rules nor with access to the institutional courts.
170. This must be taken in the context of the limited nature of the data. It is possible that ad
hoc arbitrations-where there is no institution listing the arbitrations or publishing extracts of
cases-are more likely to be confidential. If correct, the missing ad hoc awards could affect the
validity of this statement.
171. This may be in part because the unit of analysis was arbitrations with a publicly available
award. UNCTAD's unit of analysis was broader but unverifiable.
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Similar to UNCTAD's data, there was a large number of cases
resolved at ICSID-whether under the ICSID Convention or ICSID's
Additional Facility Rules. In a more specific breakdown of the applicable
arbitration rules, out of the eighty-two cases, forty-nine (59.8%) were
resolved under ICSID Convention Rules, twelve cases (14.6%) were
resolved under ICSID's Additional Facility Rules, and five cases (6.1%)
were resolved under SCC Rules.'72 Of the remainder, 14 cases (17.1%)
were resolved pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules while two cases (2.4%)
used other rules 173 (See Table 3).
Table 3: Total Number of Investment Treaties Broken Down by Arbitral
Forum
Forum Applicable Rules Number of Cases
ICSID ICSID Convention Rules 49
ICSID Additional Facility 12
SCC SCC Rules 5
Ad Hoc UNCITRAL Rules 14
Other Rules 2
Total 82
Future research might analyze why certain arbitral institutions and
rules were chosen over others. Investment treaties themselves may limit
the institutions where investors can arbitrate. This means that institutions
may be underutilized. The ICC, for example, has a body to review awards
before they are published to suggest corrections, which provides a
structural safeguard to encourage consistency. None of the cases in this
population, however, utilized the ICC. There may also be a need for the
administrative assistance of tried and tested institutions, particularly those
with the experience of managing government respondents. ICSID has
institutional expertise and an affiliation with the World Bank that make it
172. These numbers total sixty-one (instead of the sixty cases listed as affiliated with ICSID
in the previous section) because Yaung Chi Oo Trading was an ad hoc arbitration that used
ICSID-AF rules. See supra note 167-68 and accompanying text.
173. In these two cases, arbitration rules came from the investment treaty itself. See Eureko
v. Poland, Partial Award (Aug. 19, 2005), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Eureko-
PartialAwardandDissentingOpinion.pdf [hereinafter Eureko Award]; Sedelmayer v. Russian
Federation, Arbitration Award (July 7, 1998), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/investment
.sedelmayer v-ru.pdf [hereinafter Sedelmayer Award].
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an attractive institution to manage disputes. 74  Determining what factors
have the most influence over parties' dispute resolution choices provides an
opportunity to craft more nuanced disputing systems.
There would also be utility in considering whether there are other
differences associated with each type of arbitral forum. For example, it
would be useful to consider whether investors or governments were more
or less likely to win in one venue or another. It might also be worthwhile
to determine whether the awards themselves or arbitration costs were
higher with a particular type of institution. Likewise, it may be useful to
consider whether particular forums have diversity in their arbitrator pool.
In this way, treaty negotiators could obtain information about the utility of
each dispute resolution option that would be helpful in drafting treaties.
Furthermore, having data will put lawyers in a better position to advise
clients about the utility of particular dispute resolution choices and allow
clients to make informed decisions.
4. Industries Affected
UNCTAD described investment sectors subject to arbitration and
suggested that cases involve "the whole range of investment activities and
all kinds of investments, including privatization contracts and State
Concessions."' 75 UNCTAD reported that "less than half of the cases (42%)
involved the services sector, including electricity distribution,
telecommunications, debt instruments, water services and waste
management" and that 29% of the cases "relate to mining and oil and gas
exploration."'76  In a more dramatic statement, two NGOs recently
suggested 70% of ICSID cases "involve private investment in public
services such as water, electricity, and telecommunications, or investments
in natural resources such as oil, gas and mining."' 1
77 Neither UNCTAD171
nor NGOs 179 have provided information about the origin, coding or analysis
174. See generally CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY
(2001).
175. UNCTAD, 2005 IIA Monitor No. 4, supra note 59, at 4.
176. UNCTAD, 2006 IIA Monitor No. 4, supra note 59, at 3.
177. IPS & FWW Press Release, supra note 138. The report suggests that 42% of cases
involve "the services sector (water, electricity, telecommunications, and waste management)" and
29% are "related to oil, gas and mining." See ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 6, at ix.
178. In UNCTAD's online database that became public around January 2007,
http://www.unctad.org/iia-dbcases/search.aspx, the ability to search by industry does not exist.
When running a simple search, it is not clear how the "Sector" or "Industry" variables were
constructed and coded. After this paper was accepted for publication, UNCTAD informed the
author that it will be providing a new database with enhanced searchability and other functions.
179. The Anderson & Gursky report neither details the data or coding methodology that
supported its results. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 6. To the extent that it focuses on
ICSID cases only, there are two problems. First, by ignoring investment treaty cases arising
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of their data. This study analyzed data about industry that came from the
awards and used a code book to make coding determinations.
8
1
Overall, nineteen different industries were involved in investment
treaty arbitration. Disputes involving industries arguably providing "public
services" accounted for (1) 23.2% (n=19) of cases in the energy sector, (2)
7.3% (n=6) related to waste management, (3) 6.1% (n=5) related to water
disputes, (4) 6.1% (n=5) of cases related to chemical or mining investment,
and (5) 4.9% (n=4) related to telecommunications. This total of 47.6%
contrasts slightly with the data from UNCTAD and the NGOs. 8 1 Similar
to UNCTAD's conclusions, the data from this research indicated that the
most heavily arbitrated sector was energy (n=19). Other popular sectors-
with six cases (7.3%) each-were the financial sector, food and beverage
sector, and transportation. There were also five cases (6.1%) related to real
estate transactions (See Chart 3).
external to ICSID, it omits relevant data. Second, by bringing in ICSID cases that do not involve
investment treaty claims, it includes irrelevant data.
180. During conversations with staff at ICSID and other World Bank offices, there was not a
readily available system for classifying investment types. Since nothing was available publicly,
the Code Book created bespoke, detailed coding rules. The author recognizes that these
investment categories have not been established in the literature or subject to analysis to confirm
its measurement validity. The author welcomes analysis of this kind and/or information from
UNCTAD and ICSID about how they classify industries so that a reliable coding strategy could
be constructed.
181. This may, however, be more of a function of the methodology and coding approaches.
Without transparent access to their data and method, it cannot be confirmed.
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Industry Involved in Arbitration
Chart 3: Frequency breakdown of different industries involved in treaty
arbitration cases. There were nineteen (23.17%) cases in the energy industry. Six
cases (7.32%) arose in the Financial, Food-Beverage, Transport and Waste
Management industries. There were also five cases (6.10%) in each of the
following industries: Chemical-Mining, Industrial Supplies, Real Estate, and
Water. There were four cases (4.88%) in the Telecommunications and three cases
(3.66%) in the Insurance industry. There were two cases (2.44%) in Computer-
Information, Consumer Goods, Government Services, and Other Business. There
was one case (1.22%) each in Capital Goods, Entertainment, Postal, and Other.
(Mean number of cases per industry N= 4.32; SD = 4.06; N = 82.)
Having identified sectors subject to arbitration, future research might
consider what makes these industries susceptible to disputes. It might also
consider the effect of investment levels in each sector, investor awareness
of treaty rights, the effect of governmental activity in these sectors, and
government stability. Such analysis also might generate preliminary data
that could be useful to policy makers. Identifying sectors where conflict is
likely to arise in the future provides governments negotiating treaties with
an opportunity to consider the need for and desirability of crafting specific
dispute resolution mechanisms for industries most likely to be affected by
conflict.1
2
Given the comparatively high number of claims, one might imagine a
specific dispute resolution process for the energy sector. Governments may
also use this data to consider the utility of excluding sectors from a grant of
investment protection in the process of drafting or renegotiating an
investment treaty. The United States has exempted certain sectors from
182. Franck, supra note 9.
Industries Involved in Investment Treaty Arbitration
'S
20071
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
investment protection.'83 Other countries may wish to adopt this practice.
Overall, the general breadth of industries bringing claims suggests that
governments may wish to draft broad dispute resolution mechanisms to
cover claims that are likely to arise in a variety of industries.
C. Claim #2: Is There an Increasing Number of Treaty Arbitrations?
The UNCTAD literature refers to a "litigation explosion" of
investment treaty arbitration."8 One commentator even suggested "there
seems to be a new award every week."' 85 While acknowledging that "[tihe
total number of treaty-based investment arbitrations is impossible to
measure," UNCTAD observes that the actual number of claims is "very
likely larger than what is known."' 86 As of November 2004, UNCTAD
reported there were approximately 160 known investment arbitration
183. Treaty with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, S. EXEC. REP. No. 47, 102d Cong. 2d Sess., at 8
(1992), Annex. These sectors include:
[a]ir transportation; ocean and coastal shipping; banking; insurance; government grants;
government insurance and loan programs; energy and power production; custom house
brokers; ownership of real property; ownership and operation of broadcast or common
carrier radio and television stations; ownership of shares in the Communications Satellite
Corporation; the provision of common carrier telephone and telegraph services; the
provision of submarine cable services; use of land and natural resources; mining in the
public domain; primary dealerships in United States government securities; and maritime
services and maritime-related services.
Id.
184. UNCTAD, Review, supra note 59, at 4-6; UNCTAD, Research Developments, supra
note 24, at 13-15; Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The "Baby Boom" of Treaty-Based Arbitrations and
the Jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunals, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 387, 387-88 (2005) (referring to
the increasing number of cases as a "baby boom" of investment treaty arbitration); Salacuse,
Explanations, supra note 9; Eloise Obadia, ICSID, Investment Treaties and Arbitration: Current
and Emerging Trends, ICSID NEWS, Fall 2001, at 4, 4, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/n-
18-2-4.htm; see also Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a
Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121, 124 n.11 (2006) (referring to the
growth of investment treaty arbitration and noting "ICSID arbitration is only part of the
explosion").
185. Barton Legum, Investment Treaty Arbitration's Contribution on International
Commercial Arbitration, DisP. RESOL. J., Aug.-Oct. 2005, at 60, 72 (noting the increase and
stating that in early 2000 "the number of awards in investment treaty cases could be measured on
one hand").
186. UNCTAD, Review, supra note 59, at 5-6. This is due in part to the confidential and
non-transparent aspects of many investment treaty dispute resolution mechanisms. This pattern is
changing, and there are a variety of reforms that have expanded the transparency of the
investment treaty process. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 15, arts. 28-29; Agreement
Between Canada and __ for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 31-33, (2004),
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf (Canada's Model




cases.'87 By the end of 2005, UNCTAD identified at least 229 known
arbitration cases, two-thirds of which were filed within the last five
years.'8 8 It also reported that twenty-five new claims were filed in the first
eleven months of 2006.189
UNCTAD explained that its data was "based on extensive research
and interviews. ' 90 It is not clear how data was collected, coded, and
analyzed.' 9' The unit of analysis is not entirely clear given different
references to cases "filed"'192 and "known" cases. 193 Presumably, because
cases can be filed and confidential, these two variables are not necessarily
identical, which makes it difficult to determine what was measured.
Because the data is not publicly available, 94 it is difficult to replicate the
results and assess the validity of the research conclusions.
187. UNCTAD, 2005 HA Monitor No. 4, supra note 59, at I (claiming that as at November
2005 there were 219 known treaty-based investor-state arbitrations); UNCTAD, Disputes on the
Rise, supra note 59, at I (discussing the increase in investment treaty arbitration).
188. Press Release, Institution UNCTAD Reviews Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases
and Draws Implications for Developing Countries (Feb. 5, 2006), http://www.unctad.
org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=6967&intltemlD= 1528&lang= 1 (observing that the
"cumulative number of known treaty-based cases [increased] to at least 229 through the end of
the 2005 ([although] the number stood at 219 at the time of printing of [UNCTAD's] report)");
see also UNCTAD, Review, supra note 59, at 4; ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 6, at ix
(stating "lawsuits have exploded worldwide" and citing UNCTAD data in support of assertion).
189. UNCTAD, 2006 IIA Monitor No. 4, supra note 59, at 2. Although the methodology was
not explained, the publication did indicate the draft was prepared by Federico Ortino who was
affiliated with the British Institute of International and Comparative Law. Id.
190. UNCTAD, Review, supra note 59, at 6. It is also unclear who did the research that
UNCTAD published. An editor of an NGO-sponsored online newsletter, Luke Eric Peterson,
stated he was the author of the study. See Luke Eric Peterson, UNCTAD Study Provides New
Data on Incidence of Investment Treaty Arbitration, INV. TREATY NEWS, Jan. 12, 2006, available
at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn.janl2_2006.pdf; see also UNCTAD, Disputes on the Rise,
supra note 59, at 1 n. 1 (suggesting the note "is based on a note prepared by L. Peterson. The final
version benefited from comments from C. Schreuer and T. Walde."); UNCTAD, 2005 IA
Monitor No. 4, supra note 59, at I n.* (suggesting research was "undertaken by Luke Eric
Peterson, Global Arbitration Tracking & Expertise. The final version benefited from comments
from Bertram Boie, Anna Joubin-Bret and Joachim Karl."). A later version suggests Federico
Ortino of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law's Investment Treaty Forum
prepared the draft. UNCTAD, 2006 IIA Monitor No. 4, supra note 59, at 2 n.*. While it is
possible that Mr. Peterson did the early studies and Mr. Ortino simply updated them, it would be
useful to disclose this and how the methodology differed, if at all.
191. UNCTAD's publications suggest the data does not "include cases where a party signaled
its intention to submit a claim to arbitration, but has not yet actually commenced the arbitration."
UNCTAD, 2005 HA Monitor No. 4, supra note 59, at 2; see also UNCTAD, Disputes on the
Rise, supra note 59, at 2 (indicating notices of intent are not counted); UNCTAD, Disputes, supra
note 59, at 5-6. Beyond this, little is known about the methodology.
192. UNCTAD, 2006 HA Monitor No. 4, supra note 59, at 1.
193. UNCTAD, 2005 HA Monitor No. 4, supra note 59, at 1-3.
194. After the initial draft of this paper was written, UNCTAD released a new database with
information about investment treaty claims. It is unclear whether all or a portion of these cases
form the data upon which UNCTAD's conclusions are based. Although the database is difficult
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The data in this study supports the assertion that there has been an
increase in the use of investment treaty arbitration. Using the date the
award was issued, over time, there was an increase in the number of
arbitration awards generally and the number of final arbitration awards.
Whereas there was only one award in both 1990 and 1996, the number of
awards grew to twelve in 2000-more than a fivefold increase. By 2003
and 2004, there were sixteen awards each year. There were sixteen new
awards in 2005, and during the first five months of 2006 there were six
awards (See Chart 4).






1990 1994 1998 2002 2006
Year Tribunal Made Award
Chart 4. Histogram depicting the number of publicly available investment
treaty arbitration awards (before June 1, 2006) and providing the
frequency of the number of awards rendered each year based upon the year
a tribunal rendered the award (Mean=2002; SD=2.66; N=102).
The data reveals that there was an increase in awards finally resolving
treaty claims. With only one final award in 1990, another in 1996, and
another in 1997, it was not until 2000 that the number of final awards
climbed to seven. It reached a peak of ten in 2003. In 2004 and 2005, the
numbers tapered off slightly to seven final awards each year. In the first
five months of 2006, there were three final awards.




These numbers were smaller than those in UNCTAD's study, in part
because the unit of analysis was different. Nevertheless, the data suggests
that investment treaty arbitration has increased over time. The question of
whether this increase is an "explosion" is largely a function of perspective.
When comparing the number of awards today to the number of awards
twenty-five years ago, there has been a marked increase. If, however, one
considers the proliferation of investment treaties and increased levels of
investment, this increase is perhaps less striking.
When the number of investment treaties quintupled during the
1990s,19 there were few arbitration awards. It is possible that, when they
entered the treaties, host governments may not have appreciated that there
was a realistic probability of being subjected to suit for their conduct. This
may account for suggestions that governments were shocked by the use of
investment treaty arbitration and its magnitude.'
96
Although an increase in awards does not necessarily mean there has
been an escalation in investment treaty conflict, 97 it does suggest that
investors can and will utilize the dispute resolution provisions in treaties to
bring claims. In other words, having been given a new set of substantive
rights, investors have not been afraid to test their limits in the dispute
resolution process. If nothing else, the data indicates that governments
should be aware that signing a treaty with dispute resolution rights creates a
real (i.e., not imaginary or theoretical) risk of arbitration. Given that
investors can and do utilize such rights, governments should think critically
about what types of dispute resolution are in their long-term interests.
They may also wish to consider whether investment levels arguably
generated by the treaties are worth the cost.'98
195. U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, 10,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7 (1998) (explaining that the 1990s saw a rise in the number of
treaties "from 385 at the end of the 1980s to 1,857 at the end of the 1990s"); see also Antonio R.
Parra, ICSID and the Rise of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Will ICSID Be the Leading
Arbitration Institution in the Early 21st Century?, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 41, 42 (2000)
("In the 1990's, there was a veritable exposion in the number of BITs.").
196. Jeffrey Atik, NAFTA Repenser Chapter 11: A Catalogue of Legitimacy Critiques, 3
ASPER REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 215, 216 (2003) (suggesting that the nature of arbitration
claims and awards have made "more than a little buyer's remorse evident").
197. See generally William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming ... , 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 631 (1980-81) (discussing
how conflict can escalate to a formal dispute).
198. This might include an analysis of increased investment levels from countries where there
are and are not investment treaties. It might also compare the value of investments made versus
the financial exposure from arbitration.
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D. Claim #3: Do Investors Win More Often than Governments?
Knowing there is a real risk that investors will use investment treaty
arbitration, the question shifts to how to quantify that risk and understand
its significance. One critical element of the dispute resolution risk is the
likelihood that a party will win the dispute.
The literature demonstrates considerable disagreement over who wins
and loses treaty arbitration. Some commentators suggest investors are
primarily successful and that "host States cannot be winners in investment
arbitration."' 99 Similarly, there are claims that "Poorer Nations Pay Dearly
for Investment Deals"2" and "Investors' Odds of Winning are High." 0' 1
Even Evo Morales, President of Bolivia, said, in connection with Bolivia's
withdrawal from the World Bank and ICSID: " 'Governments from Latin
America and I think all over the world never win the cases. The
transnationals always win.' "" The implication is that under the current
process of resolving disputes, the deck is stacked against host governments.
That state of affairs is contrary to democratic values and undermines the
credibility of arbitration and investment treaties.20 3
Other commentators disagree. Some suggest that "[r]ight or wrong,
the winner wins. If it is the state, it is the state; if it is the investor, it is the
investor."'" These commentators fail to define what the baseline is for
199. Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment Arbitration?
Are Investors and Host States on a Level Playing Field?, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 69, 69
(2005).
200. Emad Mekay, Poorer Nations Pay Dearly for Investment Deals, GLOBAL POL' Y F., Nov.
29, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.igc.org/socecon/trade/unctad/2004/l129invest.htm ("[T]rade
and investment disputes involving dozens of millions of dollars are growing worldwide and
threaten to undermine the meaning of many economic treaties.").
201. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 6, at ix. But see Roberto Daffino, Sec'y-Gen.,
ICSID, Opening Remarks at Symposium in Paris, France: Making the Most of International
Investment Agreements: Common Agenda (Dec. 12, 2005), http://www.worldbank.org
/icsid/highlights/address-rd-004.htm (suggesting winners and losers of ICSID arbitration cases are
"equally divided, almost exactly 50/50 ....
202. See Mazoch, supra note 7 (referring to newspaper articles quoting President Morales).
203. See generally ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 6, at viii (suggesting that democratic
values are undermined when investment arbitration favors investors). Public Citizen reviewed a
set of cases, provided data about win-loss records, discussed a few cases where investors received
awards without explaining whether they were representative, and concluded the "findings
demonstrate that NAFTA's model of extensive foreign investor privileges and their private
enforcement outside of the domestic court system should not be replicated." See PUBLIC
CITIZEN, NAFTA CHAPTER II INVESTOR-STATE CASES: LESSONS FOR THE CENTRAL AMERICA
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT vii (2005), http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFrA
Report Final.pdf; see also id. at xvi (suggesting "the NAFTA arbitration defense bill for U.S.
taxpayers may quickly reach over $30 million" without providing evidence to support the
inference).
204. Bohuslav Klein, Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment Arbitration? Are Investors and
Host States on a Level Playing Field?, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 65, 67 (2005).
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assessing "right" and "wrong." Given that the underlying records are often
not publicly available and the inconsistency in the case law about the
meaning of fundamental legal principles, °5 it is difficult to make reliable
predictions about the legally "correct" result ex ante. Still others rely on
anecdotal information or gestalt "studies" to suggest that governments and
investors are equally likely to win cases. E°6 Some commentators have been
more methodical in their approach to analyzing party success, 2 7 albeit in
the context of NAFTA arbitrations.
This research evaluates these claims by analyzing awards that finally
resolved investment claims and considering the financial implications of
the results.
1. The Winners and Losers of Investment Treaty Arbitration
Out of the fifty-two awards finally resolving treaty claims, there were
twenty awards (38.5%) where investors won and tribunals awarded
damages. By contrast, there were thirty awards (57.7%) where
governments paid investors nothing.2 8  There were also two awards
embodying settlement agreements. In one of the settlements, the
government agreed to pay the investor nearly US$3 million.2" In the other
settlements, there was no money exchanged, but the government agreed to
examine its broadcast spectrum, reconsider a radio-broadcasting license,
and provide "three locations for the beauty salon"2 ' (See Chart 5).
205. See Franck, supra note 2, at 1558, 1661-12 (stating that the case law is inconsistent).
206. Daniel M. Price, Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment Arbitration? Are Investors and
Host States on a Level Playing Field?, 6 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 73, 74-75 (2005); see
also UNCTAD, Disputes on the Rise, supra note 59, at 4 ("Nor do all claims brought by
businesses succeed. Indeed, a significant number of cases are won by States."); UNCTAD,
Review, supra note 59, at 9-10 (referring to various claims where investors succeeded and then
commenting that "not all claims lead to the requested awards").
207. See Coe, supra note 60, at 1400-01 (reporting on NAFTA investment arbitration and
commenting "the docket to date makes plain that the probability of non-recovery, or less than
expected recovery, is high"); see also Alvarez & Park, supra note 60, at 401 (providing a "score
card" of NAFTA proceedings).
208. In Lauder v. Czech Republic, the tribunal found a breach of the treaty but did not award
damages. Because no cash was awarded, this was coded as a respondent "win." In all other
cases, the government won at either the jurisdictional or merits phase.
209. Goetz Award, supra note 80, at 527 (agreeing to pay US$2,989,636); see also Eloise
Obadia, Introductory Note: Antoine Goetz and others v. Burundi, 15 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV.
L.J. 454, 456 (2000).
210. Lemire Award, supra note 48, at 535-36 (summarizing the case settlement).
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Investor Win Government Win Settlement Agreement
Ultimate Result of Case
Chart 5: Percentage of Ultimate Winners and Losers in Investment Treaty
Cases categorizing ultimate outcome by (1) cases where the tribunal
awarded an investor damages for a treaty violation (n=20), (2) cases
where the tribunal did not make an award of damages against a
government for an alleged treaty violation (n=30), and (3) cases resolved
through a final award embodying a settlement agreement (n=2).
Both governments and investors were successful. The percentage of
ultimate winners does not appear to be meaningfully different for investors
and governments. For governments thinking about whether to include
arbitration in their dispute resolution mechanism, this may suggest that the
arbitration process itself does not necessarily disfavor them. It should
encourage them to consider arbitration as a viable dispute resolution
option.21' For investors, it suggests that it is also possible to win. As they
were less likely to win than governments, investors may wish to consider
carefully under what circumstances they will initiate arbitration.
Future analysis might also try to determine whether the Priest-Klein
model, which predicts that plaintiffs will win 50% of cases that end in a
judgment regardless of the applicable legal standard,1 2 should apply as a
211. Governments may elect to provide investors with different dispute resolution options
such as mediation, expert determination, or court litigation. Rather than considering what process
is most appropriate, debate has primarily centered on whether to permit parties to arbitrate
disputes or whether to retain their traditional immunity. See generally, Franck, supra note 9. In
the future, when considering how to manage their costs and benefits most effectively,
governments might consider what dispute resolution mechanisms (if any) will allow them to
maximize the purported benefits of signing investment treaties while minimizing potential dispute
resolution risks.
212. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (1984) (concluding that plaintiffs will tend to win 50% of cases regardless of
the legal standard).
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baseline for assessing the acceptability of investment treaty arbitration.2 3
The Priest-Klein model is based upon restrictive assumptions that may
make it inapposite. The model assumes, for example, that only close cases
will go to trial. Inconsistency in current case law and the lack of binding
precedent 214 may prevent parties from determining which cases are "close."
Likewise, informational deficiencies, such as lack of access to information
about arbitrators215 or awards, 216 may prevent parties from making accurate
assessments of the outcome. There may also be cases where political or
reputational sensitivities require adjudication even if it is not a "close"
case. 217 Moreover, the domestic civil law cases that the Priest-Klein model
was based upon are inevitably different than international investor-state
treaty cases. If the assumptions of the Priest-Klein model apply, it would
provide a useful baseline against which to compare the current win/loss
data and assess the legitimacy of the arbitration process. It would suggest
that the rough equivalence in win rates and similarity to the Priest-Klein
50/50 rate suggests the system is not unfairly balanced. Likewise, an
analogy to U.S. labor arbitration that demonstrated management won
49.6% of its cases218 suggests that win rates in investment treaty arbitration
are not unreasonable.
213. See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort
Reform: It's the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1126 (2006) (suggesting the Priest-
Klein model does not work for medical malpractice as plaintiffs lose more than 70% of the time).
214. See Franck, supra note 2, at 1558, 1611-12 (stating that case law has been inconsistent
and discussing the absence of precedent in investment arbitration).
215. Catherine Rogers has recommended the creation of public access to information about
international arbitrators to rectify this gap in the marketplace. Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation
of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM U. INT'L L. REV. 957, 1009-10 (2005). At present, no
such repository exists.
216. While this might relate to access to non-public awards, it may also relate to the lack of
access to the underlying record to make an assessment of the decision's correctness. See Eric
Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is it Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing
Nations Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 237, 256-64 (2007)
(contending that the underlying case record is difficult to access).
217. See Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A
Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 257 (1996)
(stating that "differential stakes, differential information, mis-measurement of plaintiff victory,
legal standard favoring one side, settlement costs being high relative to litigation costs, high
awards, and agency effects" can all affect the utility of the Priest-Klein model); see also Keith N.
Hylton, Information, Litigation, and Common Law Evolution, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 33, 46
(2006) (suggesting that, if the stakes are higher and/or there is an informational asymmetry, the
Priest-Klein model may not apply); Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage
Settlement, and Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
221,232 (1999) (suggesting that the assumptions of the Priest-Klein model are unrealistic).
218. See Laura J. Cooper et al., How and Why Labor Arbitrators Decide Discipline and
Discharge Cases: An Empirical Examination, (forthcoming 2007) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (finding management won 49.64% of the time, unions won 21.56% of the
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Future research should continue to assess these win rates and
determine how they change, if at all, over time. It might also consider
whether investors from specific countries or groups of countries won or
lost. In cases involving only U.S. investors, for example, investors won
seven times. Governments won eleven times, and there was one settlement
agreement. 19 While it would be inappropriate to conclude U.S. investors
lose significantly more than host governments given the small numbers,
there was a pattern in that direction.22° The experience of U.S. investors
appeared similar to the general class of investors. Future research may
consider whether investors from a particular country are particularly
successful or unsuccessful and if differences among countries are
statistically significant. Particularized assessment at this level may provide
valuable information for specific countries attempting to assess the costs
and benefits of arbitration. It may also provide a more nuanced assessment
of whether the arbitration process inappropriately favors the developed
world.
2. Winning and Losing Jurisdiction
There were also interesting patterns about whether investors or
governments won at different stages of the arbitration process. Out of the
eighty-seven awards dealing with jurisdictional issues, investors
successfully established jurisdiction in fifty awards (57.5% of the time). In
contrast, governments defeated an investor's jurisdictional arguments and
ended the claim in ten awards (11.5%).
In twenty-seven awards (31%) dealing with jurisdictional issues, the
parties had mixed success. In other words, some claims were allowed to
proceed to the merits while other claims terminated. This meant that a
government might prevent one investor from proceeding to the merits, but
other investors in the same case might be able to proceed. For example, in
Champion Trading v. Egypt, there was no jurisdiction over three U.S.-
Egyptian dual nationals. Nevertheless, the entities they controlled could
continue the arbitration against Egypt.
Investors were largely successful at the jurisdictional phase.
Jurisdictional challenges held some strategic benefits for governments and
permitted the dismissal of the entire claim in some cases. Partial success
might also minimize the scope of the dispute either in terms of claims
themselves or parties bringing the claims. This can narrow the range of
time, and 28.81% of the cases involved "split decisions" where an arbitrator found just cause for
lesser discipline than what management imposed).
219. There were a total of forty-two cases involving U.S. investors. The remaining twenty-
three cases did not involve a final determination of treaty claims.
220. The settlement agreement did not involve a monetary transfer.
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liability, expand settlement opportunities, and possibly encourage the use
of other dispute resolution mechanisms.22'
3. Winning and Losing on the Merits
Although the number of awards addressing merits issues (n=41) was
smaller, there were interesting patterns. Unlike at the jurisdictional phase,
investors were less likely to be completely successful on the merits.
Claimants were successful on all of the causes of action they alleged in
only five awards (12.2%). In contrast, governments were slightly more
successful at this phase. They eliminated all of the investor's claims in
sixteen awards (39%).
Nearly half of the awards (n=20) had mixed success. In other words,
in 48.8% of the cases that involved a decision on the merits, an investor
recovered on at least one substantive cause of action (i.e., discrimination)
but was unsuccessful on another aspect (i.e., expropriation). This scenario
was similar to the case of MTD v. Chile, where the investor won some, but
not all of its claims. 222 It also might involve cases like Genin v. Estonia
where all of the investor's claims were dismissed, but so were the
government's counterclaims. 223  Future research might usefully consider
which type of claims and government conduct are correlated with positive,
negative, or mixed outcomes. Presumably, such information might help
parties calculate their arbitration risk and provide opportunities to create
dispute resolution mechanisms that meet parties' needs.224
4. Winning and Losing at the Damages Stage
Only twenty-one awards addressed damages. The overall pattern was
for mixed success, and parties' success was mixed in eighteen of the
awards (85.7%). For example, in S.D. Myers v. Canada, the investor
recovered on the basis of a net income stream, but the tribunal denied the
claim for lost opportunity damages.225
221. See infra notes 315-21 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of other dispute
resolution mechanisms).
222. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01i7, Award
(May 25, 2004), 44 I.L.M. 91 (2005), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MTD-Award.pdf.
223. Genin Award, supra note 3 1, at 491-92.
224. While it would be useful to assess arbitration data in light of data about other dispute
resolution mechanisms, such data does not yet exist. This may be partially a result of how
governments craft dispute resolution mechanisms at present. Court litigation may not even be an
option, and even where it is, investors have not used them. Franck, supra note Il, at 368 n.150.
Other processes, like negotiation, may not be required or occur confidentially so that data is not
publicly available.
225. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Second Partial Award, UNCITRAL (Oct. 2002), 100, 161-
62, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SDMeyers-secondPartiaAward.pdf.
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Cases where either investors or governments were completely
successful were rare. A host government was completely successful at the
damages phase in only one case, Lauder v. Czech Republic. 26 There were
two cases where the claimant was wholly successful in damage arguments.
Both cases shared a common feature: they involved financial instruments.
In Fedax v. Venezuela, the amount in controversy was not disputed because
the value was recorded in promissory notes.227 Similarly, in Maffezini v.
Spain, the government did not dispute damages.228 Future research might
consider which arguments were successful and which were unsuccessful in
the assessment of damages, the most effective types of data presentation,
and the implications for a party having different damage calculations.
5. Implications of Winning at Different Stages
Investors were more successful at jurisdictional stages whereas
governments were more successful on the merits. This may implicate
structural safeguards intended to streamline the arbitration process.
ICSID's new rules provide an expedited mechanism to strike out
claims. Arbitration Rule 41 provides that, within thirty days after a tribunal
is constituted, "a party may ... file an objection that 'a claim is manifestly
without legal merit.' "229 The provision was passed to provide governments
an earlier opportunity to rid themselves of unmeritorious claims.23°
It is not clear whether ICSID's revised arbitration rules will have the
desired outcome. Since a party may object to a claim, the text of the rule is
not limited solely to governments. Theoretically, a government could file
an early objection related to jurisdiction, the merits, or damages. Investors
might likewise try to quash governmental counterclaims."' It is also
226. Lauder v. Czech Republic, Award, UNCITRAL (Sept. 9, 2001),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LauderAward.pdf.
227. Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Award (Mar. 9, 1998), 37 I.L.M.
1391, 1396, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Fedax-1998-Last.pdf.
228. Maffezini Award, supra note 89, at 277.
229. ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 115, at R. 41(5); see also id. at R. 41(6) (stating that
if a tribunal determines a claim is unmeritorious "it shall render an award to that effect."). This is
similar to processes in the new U.S. Model BIT. 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 15, art. 28(4)-
(6).
230. ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration:
Discussion Paper, 4, (Oct. 22, 2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/
improve-arb.pdf (referring to the possible creation of expedited procedures for dismissal of
unmeritorious claims).
231. Although not coded for the purpose of statistical analysis, there were two cases where
governments alleged counterclaims. In both instances, tribunals held they lacked jurisdiction
over the governmental counterclaims. Genin Award, supra note 31; Saluka Investments BV v.
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic's Counterclaim
(May 7, 2004), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Saluka-DecisiononJurisdiction-counterclaim.pdf;
see also Sedelmayer Award, supra note 173 (indicating the investor had argued that Russia had
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possible that investors' success at the jurisdictional phase may be replicated
in the new procedure. If this is the case, the rule could cut against
governments who (1) have their counterclaims dismissed and (2) cannot
weed out investor claims early on jurisdictional grounds. If, however, Rule
41 is used to speed up the success a government might achieve on the
merits, then the rule might achieve its objective. While there were no
awards using Rule 41 in this population, future analyses might consider
how this provision is being used in practice to determine its efficacy. This
may, for example, provide guidance to those countries that consider
following the U.S. Model BIT that provides for early decisions on
"preliminary question[s]. '232  Likewise, the likelihood of success and
failure may affect parties' willingness to use these streamlined procedures
instead of relying on a more traditional approach.
E. Claim #4: Do Investors Recover Large Amounts?
Knowing there is a real risk that investors will use investment treaty
arbitration, the question shifts to how to quantify that risk and understand
its significance. One aspect of understanding the dispute resolution risk is
quantifying the financial implications of pursuing treaty arbitration. This
includes, for example, an assessment of the amounts claimed and
awarded.233
Commentators make broad-often unsubstantiated-claims about the
amounts in controversy and investors' ultimate recoveries.234 Bill Moyers
suggested that arbitrators "can force taxpayers to pay billions of dollars in
lawsuits. 235  Others have commented that "[e]conomic [t]hreats are
[s]ignificant 2 36 or that governments "find themselves hauled before
arbitration panels and compelled to pay large amounts of compensation for
made a de facto counterclaim for damages whereas Russia stated its defense involved arguing for
decreased damages).
232. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 15, art. 28(4) (describing the 2004 U.S. Model
BITs procedures for "preliminary questions").
233. While quantifying the financial implications of pursuing treaty arbitration could involve
an assessment of the amounts investors actually recovered, such assessment is beyond the scope
of the current project.
234. See Richard Newfarmer, Beyond Merchandise Trade: Services, Investment, Intellectual
Property and Labor Mobility, in INT'L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., WORLD BANK,
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2005, at 97, 107-08 (2005), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2005/Resources/gep2005.pdf (indicating investors
making claims under NAFTA have alleged over $1 trillion in damages but the total damages
awarded has been in the order of $35 million); PUBLIC CITIZEN, RECORD, supra note 3, at vii
(suggesting that "$28 billion has been claimed by NAFTA investors").
235. NOW with Bill Moyers: Trading Democracy (PBS television broadcast Feb. 1, 2002)
[hereinafter Trading Democracy], available at http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/
transcript_tdfull.html (transcript).
236. ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 6, at ix.
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enacting regulations they had considered in their sovereign domain." '37
Such criticisms have cast doubt upon the acceptability of arbitration.238
Meanwhile, some refer to an individual case to suggest it "illustrates
the high cost of violating a[n investment treaty]" '239 as if to suggest that it is
representative of other awards.2" Others refer to a range of damages24" '
without indicating whether they are representative. These practices are
troubling. For example, in 2005, UNCTAD referred to several cases to
indicate "some claims involve large sums '24 2 and cited cases to support this
assertion. This included the three biggest awards in this study's population.
One of these awards-the US$133 million CMS award-was apparently
referenced twice as if there were two separate US$133 million awards,
even though there was only one. 243  It also referenced a US$266 million
award against Lebanon, which is not publicly available and cannot be
verified.24 It also referred to the US$824 million award in CSOB v. Slovak
Republic24 5 even though damages were not based on an investment treaty
claim.24 6 Rather it involved damages for breach of a separately negotiated
237. Newfarmer, supra note 234, at 118.
238. See generally ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 6, at 29 (concluding that the "current
system of international investor protections" is both "flawed and unbalanced").
239. Amin George Forji, Does Investment Always Foster Development? The Effects of
Bilateral Investment Treaties on Developing Countries, http://www.bilaterals.org
/article.php3?id-article=5998 (last visited Nov. 11, 2007).
240. UNCTAD tried to provide balanced information. It observed that "[n]ot all claims lead
to the requested awards" and "[viery large claims often end up yielding very small awards."
UNCTAD, Review, supra note 59, at 10. Nevertheless, the next awards they cited to as
"small"-Metalclad and S.D. Myers-were some of the next highest damage awards in the
present study. Id. at 10; see infra notes 255, 257.
241. Franck, supra note 11, at 346; see also Price, supra note 206, at 74-75 (stating that in the
NAFTA context "US$ 1.24 billion in damages has been claimed; a total of US$ 23 million in
damages has been awarded. US$ 200 million has been claimed against Mexico; US$ 18 million
has been awarded. US$180 million has been claimed against Canada; US$ 4 million has been
awarded. US$ 865 million has been claimed against the United States; US$ 0 has been
awarded.")
242. UNCTAD, Review, supra note 59, at 8.
243. Id. at 9.
244. The only publicly available information on this award came from one of the parties to
the dispute. Press Release, France Telecom, France Telecom: Award of the Arbitration Tribunal
on the Dispute with the Republic of Lebanon (Feb. 22, 2005),
http://www.francetelecom.conmen/financials/J urnalists/press-releases/CP-oldattOO029460/CP-
LIBAN_050222.pdf (announcing an award of $266 million to a subsidiary of France Telecom).
245. UNCTAD, Review, supra note 59, at 9; cf ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 6, at ix.
246. The case started with claims under both an investment treaty and a commercial
agreement; the tribunal held there was jurisdiction under the commercial agreement but not under
the treaty. Ceskoslovenska, Jurisdiction, supra note 68, at 283 (upholding jurisdiction on the




commercial agreement governed by national law.247 Others have failed to
distinguish between disputes arising under international treaties and
commercial contracts arising under domestic law.248
Some scholars offer more considered commentary. In his analysis of
NAFTA disputes, Professor Jack Coe observed that investors "alleged
extensive damages. '249 He then observed that expropriation claims have
only led to one compensable taking and two cases had small awards for
violations of "fair and equitable treatment. '250 Barton Legum's analysis of
NAFTA awards similarly suggested, "the total amount of damages asserted
in the claims decided [prior to 2004] amount[ed] to a little over US$1.2
billion, yet the total recovery by claimants was US$23 million. The total
recovery amounts to a little under two cents on the dollar."25'
Unfortunately, neither Coe nor Legum's work considered the larger body
of investment treaties.
The question then becomes: what are the financial implications of
pursuing investment treaty arbitration?
1. Amounts Claimed
Out of the eighty-two cases in the present study, only forty-four
quantified an investor's claimed damages either fully or partially. The
lowest amount claimed was in Maffezini v. Spain for approximately
US$155,314 (ESP 30 million)2 52 whereas the highest amount claimed was
in Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine for US$9.4 billion.253 Overall, the
247. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4,
Award (Dec. 29, 2004), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Cesk-Slovakia-AwardDec2004.pdf
(awarding damages of both US$10 million and almost 25 billion Slovak crowns for respondent's
violations).
248. Noah D. Rubins, The Allocation of Costs and Attorney's Fees in Investor-State
Arbitration, 18 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 109, 125 (2003) (referring to data published by
the International Chamber of Commerce to suggest that 58% of commercial arbitrations initiated
under its rules in 1999 were worth more than US$1 million but for "ICSID cases filed in 1997,
the average claim size was about US$110 million"); Salacuse, ADR, supra note 9, at II
(suggesting "the average award in an ordinary international commercial arbitration is less than a
million dollars, [but] an award in an investor state arbitration is usually many times that"). These
commentators may have only meant to refer to investor-state arbitration and not investment treaty
arbitration.
249. Coe, supra note 60, at 1400.
250. Id. at 1401.
251. Barton Legum, Lessons Learned from the NAFTA: The New Generation of U.S.
Investment Treaty Arbitration Provisions, 19 ICSID Rev.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 344, 346-47 (2004).
252. Maffezini Award, supra note 89, at 277 (awarding 30 million pesetas plus interest).
253. Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award (Sept. 16, 2003), 44
I.L.M. 404, para. 1.1 (2005), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/GenerationUkraine.pdf.
20071
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
average amount of damages claimed in those fourty-four cases was
approximately US$343.4 million." 4
The size of these claimed damages may be in part responsible for
public concern about the role of investment treaty arbitration, particularly
for governments with more limited capital reserves. If a tribunal were to
award an investor the full value of its claim, theoretically there might be
fewer financial resources available to meet other critical domestic
priorities.
2. Amounts Awarded
There were fifty-two cases in which tribunals made awards that
resulted in a damages determination (if any) for treaty-based claims.2 15 Out
of these cases, there were thirty-one instances in which investors were
awarded nothing.256  In the remaining twenty-one instances, tribunals
awarded damages.25 7 In other words, tribunals awarded investors damages
in fewer than half of the cases.
The average amount of damages awarded by tribunals was
approximately US$10.4 million.258  This average may not be dissimilar
from other international law adjudications. For example, a recent decision
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights required Colombia to pay
US$7.8 million to relatives of twelve judicial workers killed in a massacre
by army-backed paramilitaries 9.2 " Aside from cases that resulted in
damages of US$0, the lowest damage award where an investor received
something was approximately US$24,603 (310,000 Moldovan Lei) in Iurii
Bogdanov v. Moldova.26  The highest award was in CME v. Czech
254. The median damages claimed were US$59,028,304; the mode was US$50 million.
255. Given the missing data (i.e., not every case contained an award quantifying and/or
awarding damages), cases with quantified and awarded damages were not always the same. Out
of fifty-two awards finally resolving treaty claims, thirty-one quantified claimed damages.
256. This figure includes the settlement from Lemire v. Ukraine where no cash changed
hands. See Lemire Award, supra note 48, at 335-36.
257. This figure includes the settlement in Goetz v. Burundi where the government paid the
investor nearly US$3 million. See Obadia, supra note 209.
258. The median and mode for damages awarded was zero.
259. Associated Press, Colombia Ordered to Pay US$7.8 Million in Massacre of 12 Judicial
Workers by Paramilitaries, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), June 8, 2007, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/09/america/LA-GEN-Colombia-Massacre-Ruling.php.
This case many not be representative of other international law adjudications involving
individuals and states.
260. lurii Bogdanov, Agurdino-Invest Ltd. and Agurdino-Chimia JSC v. Republic of




Republic,26 1  where the investor secured a substantive award of
US$269,814,000.
A striking finding was the difference between the average amounts
claimed and awarded. The difference between the average amounts
claimed and awarded was approximately US$333 million (See Chart 6). If
the outlier, Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine,262 is removed, the difference is
statistically significant.263











Damages Claimed Damages Awarded
Mean Amounts
Chart 6: Bar chart reflecting the mean damages claimed by investors-
US$343,430,684.88 (n=44; SD=1,509, 734,385)-for cases where investors
quantified claimed damages and the mean damages awarded by
tribunals-US$10,389,459.10 (n=52; SD=10,389,460)-in awards finally
resolving treaty claims.
261. CME Czech Rep. B.V. v. Czech Republic, U.N. Comm'n on Int't Trade Law, Final
Award (Mar. 14, 2003), para. 620, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2003-Final_002.pdf
[hereinafter CME Award].
262. Generation Ukraine had the highest damages claimed; and, given that it was
approximately US$500 million higher than the next largest number, a box plot revealed that it
was a distinctive number in the overall distribution of damages claimed. When this outlier for
claimed damages is included, the confidence intervals for the two populations (namely amount
claimed and amount received) do overlap; but, because of the small number of cases and the
broad nature of the distribution, this does not necessarily detract from the substantive difference
between the two figures.
263. Having done a standard deviation of the two populations of Amount Claimed versus
Amount Received, the confidence intervals (at the 95% level) for the populations do not overlap.
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Other comparisons exhibit a similar pattern.264  For the twenty-one
awards where tribunals awarded cash to an investor, the average award was
US$25,583,916. This is a US$317.9 million difference between the
amount claimed and awarded. 65 Moreover, when considering the thirty-
one cases for which there was data about both damages claimed and
awarded, the difference was even larger: the average amount claimed was
approximately US$404 million while the average amount awarded was
approximately US$17 million-a difference of US$387 million. 66 This
phenomenon might be best demonstrated by reference to two cases. In
Methanex v. United States, a Canadian investor made a claim for nearly
US$1 billion but was awarded nothing.267 The gap was less stark in
Feldman v. Mexico 261 where a U.S. investor alleged damages in the order of
US$50 million but was awarded approximately US$9.5 million. 69
As an average is a particularly blunt statistical instrument, it is helpful
to look at damage awards categorically. In contrast to suggestions that
tribunals award large sums, tribunals only awarded more than US$10
million in four cases.270  There were four cases where investors were
awarded between US$5-10 million.' There were also thirteen investors
awarded between US$5 million and US$1 272 (See Chart 7). In the
264. Although the unit of analysis and research methodology is not clear, recent research
from a second source also suggests there is a gap between amounts claimed and received. This
preliminary work, which the author received two months after this Article was accepted for
publication, references gaps in three different substantive actions (i.e., expropriation,
discrimination, and unfair and inequitable treatment). See RICHARD E. WALCK, CURRENT
STATISTICS ON INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION (2007), available at http://gfa-
llc.com/practiceareas.html.
265. When comparing differences in the medians and modes of damages claimed versus
awarded, there was at least a US$50 million difference. See supra notes 254, 258.
266. The median amounts alleged and received were in the order of US$38 million and
US$155,000 respectively. Similarly, the mode amount alleged was US$50 million while the
mode amount recovered was US$0.
267. Methanex Award, supra note 33.
268. This case was selected as the mode of damages claimed was US$50 million and the
medial was close to US$60 million. Supra note 254.
269. Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award (Dec. 16, 2002), 18 ICS1D
REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J 488 (2003), 42 I.L.M. 625 (2003), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/
documents/feldmanmexico-award-english.pdf.
270. See Metalclad Award, supra note 34 (US$16,685,000), CME Award, supra note 261,
Occidental v. Ecuador (US$71,533,549); CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina
(US$133,200,000).
271. American Manufacturing and Trading, Inc. v. Zaire (US$9,000,000); Wena Hotel
Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, 42 I.L.M. 896
(US$8,061,896.55); MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Chile (US$5,871,322.42);
Thcnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States (US$5,533,017.12).
272. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada (US$3,844,443); Goetz Award, supra note 80
(US$2,989,636); Nykomb Synergistics Technology Holding AB v. Latvia (US$2,967,139);
Swembalt AB v. Latvia (US$ 2,506,258); Sedelmayer Award, supra note 173, at 118
2007] INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 61
remainder of the cases, investors did not receive damages. This suggests
that the majority of investors received nothing. When investors did win,
they did not win big.
Ordered Categories of Damages Awarded to
Investors
$0 Awarded $1 - $5m Awarded $5m - $10m Over US$10m
Awarded Awarded
Categorical Breakdown of Amounts Awarded
Chart 7: Ordered categories of the U.S. dollar value of awards finally resolving
arbitration (n=52), grouping the breakdown of damages awarded to investors for
(1) cases awarding investors $0 (n=31), (2) cases awarding investors between $1
to $5 million (n=13), (3) cases awarding investors between $5 million and $10
million (n=4), and (4) cases awarding investors over $10 million (n=4).
While care should be taken when generalizing about categories with
small numbers, there appeared to be some patterns. For example, the risk
of government liability and the possibility of investor recovery may not be
as large as previously thought,273 and damages tended to be grouped around
three main ranges. First, there was a group of cases where investors
received nothing. Second, there was another group of cases where
tribunals awarded less than US$17 million (n=18).2 74  Third, there were
(US$2,350,000); Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt
(US$2,190,430); Petrobart v. Kyrgyz Republic (US$1,130,859); Feldman v. Mexico
(US$927,814); Fedax N.V. v Venezuela (US$598,950); Asian Products Ltd. v. Sri Lanka
(US$460,000); Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada (US$407,646); Maffezini Award, supra note 89
(US$55,314); Iurii Bogdanov, Agurdino-Invest Ltd. and Agurdino-Chimia JSC v. Republic of
Moldova (US$24,603).
273. See supra notes 234-237 and accompanying text (observing that commentators often
make broad claims about investors' ultimate recoveries); cf. Legum, supra note 251, at 344, 347-
48 (explaining treaty arbitration "creates exposure to liability for the respondent States, [but] the
level of exposure has been relatively modest in the experience of the NAFTA States").
274. In more than half the final cases (n=31), tribunals did not make an award against the
government. In another large segment (n=17), tribunals awarded investors less than US$10
million. There was also one award that was just under US$17 million.
n=13i ' n=1
n=4
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three cases where tribunals awarded more than US$70 million, and the
average of those three awards was US$158.2 million.275 The data suggests
that most tribunals were inclined to make awards that were on the smaller
side (namely US$10 million or lower), while a few others made higher
awards (in the order of US$75 or 150 million). 76
It is critical to recall that damages depend upon the nature of the cause
of action and facts of each case. As a result, these damage patterns and the
gap between amounts claimed and awarded may be idiosyncratic. It is
possible that particular causes of actions-such as expropriation-may be
less likely to be successful but may have a larger claim for damages. In
contrast, claims for fair and equitable treatment may lead to an award in an
investor's favor on the merits but a smaller damage award.277 As inferences
should be drawn from this data with care in light of its limitation, the data
provides the best available picture of the potential scope of claimed and
actual government liability.
275. A histogram of the damages awarded indicates that damages are most heavily distributed
around zero. There are other data points around the US$5 million, US$15 million and US$250
million.
276. While not subject to the same coding process, a cursory review of awards on the ITA
Web site that finally resolved treaty claims between June 1, 2006 and February 25, 2007 suggests
a similar pattern. There were three cases where governments paid nothing. See Telenor Mobile
Commc'ns A.S. v. Rep. of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Award at 57 (Sept. 13, 2006),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Telenorv.HungaryAward 000.pdf (dismissing case and failing to
award damages); Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26, Award,
at 103 (Aug. 2, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/InceysaVallisoletana-en 000.pdf
(dismissing case and failing to award damages); Champion Trading Co. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9, Award, 19 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INv. L.J. 275, 291 (2006),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Championaward 000.pdf (failing to award damages). There was
one case awarding an investor less than US$10 million. PSEG Global, Inc. v. Turkey, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, at 90, (Jan. 19, 2007), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents
/PSEGGlobal-Turkey-Award.pdf (awarding the investor US$9,061,479.34). Finally, three
awards were over US$75 million and the average of those three awards was approximately
US$153.1 million. Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/08, Award (Feb. 6,
2007), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Siemens-Argentina-Award.pdf (awarding investors
US$217,838,439); ADC Affiliate Ltd. and ADC & ADMC Mgmt. Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award at 103 (Oct. 2, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents
/ADCvHungaryAward.pdf (awarding investors US$76,200,000); Azurix v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award at 158 (July 14, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents
/AzurixAwardJuly2006.pdf (finding liability in the order of US$165,240,753). It is slightly odd
that the average for cases in which tribunals awarded damages was different in comparison to the
non-coded cases. This, however, may be understood as a function of the limited nature of the
three uncoded awards and the fact that two share a common respondent state-Argentina-that
was subjected to a multiple claims in the energy sector as a result of its currency crisis.
277. Global Financial Analytics recently completed some research on this area. They do not
describe their methodology, and this prevents an assessment of the validity and reliability of their
claims. They nevertheless indicated that 9.5% of expropriation and 12.9% of discrimination




The divergence between claimed and awarded damages suggests there
are two concerns about the dispute resolution process. First, the divergence
may have practical repercussions. Parties may find it difficult to assess the
costs and benefits of pursuing arbitration. In addition, when governments
assess the costs and benefits of entering into or renewing investment
treaties, they may be unable to make reliable assessments of their financial
exposure. Second, the divergence suggests that incentives in the arbitration
system may need adjustment to promote more streamlined dispute
resolution. Assuming that there is utility in aligning claimed and received
278 beueutdamages, it may be useful to isolate variables contributing to this gap.
For example, it may be useful for governments to put cost-shifting
guidelines into investment treaties to reward investors whose claimed
damages are in line with the ultimate award or provide deterrence for
inflating claimed damages. One might imagine that, because they control
the drafting of the terms of the dispute resolution process, governments
may wish to provide tribunals with express discretion to shift costs against
parties for bringing an unmeritorious claim or motion. Such a procedure
might create financial disincentives, akin to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 sanctions, for parties who otherwise might engage in
deleterious dispute resolution tactics.
As the scope of available data expands, future research might
determine whether there are significantly different damage patterns.
Research might consider whether there are markedly different damage
assessments for OECD and non-OECD countries. It might also consider
particular countries in detail to determine whether certain ones tend to be
more or less successful in defending treaty claims.279 Finally, future
research might isolate those factors influencing damage determinations, so
stakeholders can make an informed assessment of the potential financial
risks and rewards.
Overall, the current format of investment treaty arbitration appears to
be a high stakes game for governments and investors. Although
governments were more likely to win and to face less liability than
originally anticipated, being subjected to arbitrations where investors make
large damage demands can create challenges. Particularly for those
demands that might exceed a country's financial reserves, it can create
278. Such alignment might, for example, promote more efficient dispute resolution processes
that are less likely to consume the time and money of parties.
279. Legum's analysis of NAFTA cases suggested that there were differences in liability
experienced by Canada, Mexico, and the United States. The United States had never lost a
case-the United States was never liable-whereas Mexico and Canada, according to Legum's
analysis, were respectively liable for about nine cents and four cents on the dollar. Legum, supra
note 251, at 347.
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difficulties that might make alternative dispute resolution politically
infeasible28 or create unique settlement pressures.28' Although investors
may demand large damages in order to anchor settlement discussions, this
may have adverse repercussions.282 Governments that view the demand as
either unreasonable or not in good faith may refuse to negotiate, and
arbitrators may approach damage assessments with an increased decree of
skepticism. Ultimately, where it is difficult to operationalize risk,
determine likely outcomes, and evaluate the financial implications, this can
affect the acceptability of the arbitration process.
3. Amounts Received
There are inevitably concerns about party compliance with arbitral
awards. This issue is beyond the scope of the current project, which does
not analyze subsequent proceedings or activities. Issues for future
consideration include (1) how much investors actually receive after an
award, (2) which investors pay costs for awards rendered against them,282
and (3) the scope of governmental noncompliance with awards.2"
280. Governments such as Bolivia and Venezuela, for example, recently suggested they
would withdraw from ICSID because of their concerns about the dispute resolution process. Phil
Gunson, Venezuela Is Energizing Plan for Regional Alliance, MIAMI HERALD, May 1, 2007, at
9A.
281. Where, for example, parties involved in a conflict make extreme opening offers, this can
anchor expectations in negotiation and impede rational decisionmaking behavior. See MAx H.
BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 23-28 (1992); see also
Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 139-42 (1994) (suggesting that high claims for
damages may anchor parties and "unduly influence people's expectations and, hence, their
decisions about whether to settle ... [which suggests parties] ... may fail to reach settlement on
some occasions when settlement makes good economic sense"). But see Russell Korobkin &
Chris Guthrie, Opening Offers and Out-of-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go a
Long Way, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 1, 5 (1994) (suggesting that a party who starts
"negotiations with a moderate settlement offer, [or] a softer bargaining strategy, is less likely to
reach eventual settlement than a [party] who opens with a more extreme position, a harder
bargaining strategy").
282. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 39 (4th ed. 2001) ("[If the
first set of demands is so extreme as to be seen as unreasonable, the tactic backfires. In such
cases, the party who has made the extreme first request is not seen to be bargaining in good faith.
Any subsequent retreat from that wholly unrealistic initial position is not viewed as a genuine
concession and, thus, is not reciprocated." (citation omitted)). But see Chris Guthrie et al., Inside
the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 788-89 (2001) ("[E]ven extreme, wholly absurd
anchors can affect judgment."); Joseph W. Rand, Understanding Why Good Lawyers Go Bad:
Using Case Studies in Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal Decision-Making, 9 CLINICAL L. REV.
731, 747 (2003) ("[Sltudies have shown that even unreasonable, ridiculous anchors still burrow
deep into a decision-maker's thought processes.").
283. For example, the Thunderbird tribunal ordered unsuccessful investors to pay the costs of
the Mexican government to the tune of US$1,252,862.40 (US$126,313.02 for TCE and
US$1,126,549.38 for PLC). Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States,
UNCITRAL, Arbitral Award, at 73 (Jan. 26, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
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There is some anecdotal evidence that governments have honored
investment treaty awards. Governments such as Mexico and the Czech
Republic, which were subject to two of the largest awards in this
population, namely CME and Metalclad, paid investors. Payment
occurred, however, only after litigation in national courts challenging the
underlying awards.285 Research might assess whether these cases were
representative.
Such research would be useful because there is evidence that in
international commercial arbitration, successful parties did not always
receive the awarded amount. Instead, awards were the starting point for
renegotiation. 286 Future work in investment treaty arbitration should build
ThunderbirdAward.pdf. A U.S. district court recently refused the investor's request to set aside
the award. Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, 473 F. Supp. 2d 80, 85
(D.D.C. 2007).
284. Particular concern has been noted with respect to Argentina. See generally Osvaldo J.
Marzoti, Enforcement of Treaty Awards and National Constitutions (the Argentinean Cases), 7
BUS. L. INT'L 226 (2006); Guido Santiago Tawil, Arbitration in Latin America: Current Trends
and Recent Developments, BOMCHIL GROUP NEWSL., Mar. 2004 (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) ("Argentine top officials have publicly argued the incompatibility of ICSID
arbitration with the Argentine Constitution, qualified ICSID arbitration as an immature regime,
[and] announced their will to return to the Calvo doctrine abandoned during the 90's ...."); see
also Proyecto De Ley, S.-2.577/05 (Aug. 18, 2005), http://wwwl.hcdn.gov.ar/folio-cgi-
bin/omjisapi.dll?clientlD=134672251 &advquery=2577-S-05&infobase=dae.nfo&record={ 49891
&recordswithhits=on&softpage=Document42 (proposing legislation that questions of economic
importance should not be left to international tribunals--"No quedardn sujetas a revisi6n de
jueces o tribunales internacionales cuestiones inherentes a la politica econ6mica del gobierno").
285. CME Celebrated One Year at the Stock Exchange, HopoddJfsk6 Noviny, ECON. NEWS,
July 12, 2006, available at http://www.cetv-net.com/en/press-center/media/6.shtml (observing
that CME's "net profit in 2003 exceptionally included an extra ten billion [Czech] crowns gained
in the arbitration with the Czech Republic"); Mexican Nightmare, FDI MAGAZINE, Apr. 2, 2002,
at 14, http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/l05/Mexican-nightmare.html
(explaining "Mexico gave up its appeal and agreed to pay the $16[million] in compensation to
Metalclad"); Trading Democracy, supra note 235 (stating "Mexico paid Metalclad $16,002,433"
in October 2001); see also Luke Eric Peterson, Cyprus-Based Companies Recoup $75 Mil[lion]
in BIT Arbitration Over Hungary Airport, INV. TREATY NEWS, Nov. 2, 2006, at 2, available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn-nov2_2006.pdf (observing that in ADC v. Rep. of Hungary, a
case that was not in the population of this study, Hungary agreed to fully pay the investors). The
author notes it was easy to find sources describing the damage award. See Peter S. Green, Prague
to Pay Award to Lauder Company, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Mar. 15, 2003, at 11, available
at http://www.iht.com/articles/2003/03/15/lauder-ed2_.php. It was more difficult to confirm that
the award was paid. This was intriguing because having a reputation for honoring international
obligations is likely to decrease perceived investment risk. It may, however, be affected by
political sensitivities caused by the loss of an international arbitration.
286. Richard W. Naimark & Stephaine [sic] E. Keer, Post-Award Experience in International
Commercial Arbitration, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 270, 270-74 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W.
Naimark ed., 2005) (observing that out of their sample, 100 awards were fully or partially
complied with and "26 respondents attributed compliance to negotiation after the award").
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upon this work.2"7 Quantification of the costs of initiating additional
proceedings to secure payment of awards and/or likely recovery on the
dollar would aid parties when considering their dispute resolution options.
Likewise, clarity about the enforceability of legal obligations may also
permit investors to make informed decisions about investment risks. 8
F. Claim #5: Are Arbitration Costs Substantial?
Dispute resolution risk is not simply a matter of winning, losing, and
possible damages. The true cost of investment treaty conflict requires a
quantification of other factors, such as the cost of obtaining a beneficial
outcome. 2 9 Rational actors should consider whether the cost of pursuing
investor rights or defending government action is worth the benefit.
Costs matter in part because they "can give rise to significant
difficulties at the end of a case"2 9° and are "a risk factor to take [] into
consideration before using investor-state arbitration. 291  ICSID's former
secretary-general highlighted the importance of cost when he observed that
an "issue of concern has been the growing cost of arbitration. This is
particularly true for the "low income" countries, and for small companies,
which cannot afford being represented by the most experienced and
sophisticated law firms in the field, as claimants usually are. 292 Others
express concerns that "substantial costs make contestation of an arbitral
claim an unattractive option for poorer developing countries. 293  There
may also be cost-related difficulties for small investors.294
The empirical validity of various claims about the costs of arbitration
is uncertain. Professor David Gantz observed: "[C]osts of arbitration are
287. It might also consider payment of damages in civil litigation contexts. See Hyman &
Silver, supra note 213, at 1122-23; Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the "Invisible" Profile of
Medical Malpractice Litigation: Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 348 (2005).
288. It may also provide pertinent information to political risk insurers who offer insurance
for foreign investments.
289. While this project focused on financial costs, there are undoubtedly other variables (such
as political, psychological, and social costs) that would provide a more complete picture of the
cost of investment treaty dispute resolution. Future research might usefully consider these
factors.
290. James Hope & Klaus Reichert, Costs-The Sting in the Tail, 1 GLOBAL ARB. REV. 30,
30 (2006).
291. W. Ben Hamida, Cost Issue in Investor-State Arbitration Decisions Rendered Against
the Investor: Synthetic Table, 2 T.D.M. (2005) (copy on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
292. Daflino, supra note 201.
293. Luke Eric Peterson, All Roads Lead Out of Rome: Divergent Paths of Dispute
Settlement in Bilateral Investment Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 123, 136 (Lyuba Zarsky ed., 2005), available at http://nautilus.org/archives/
enviro/PetersonFinalFormatted_2_2.PDF.
294. Coe, supra note 60, at 1400-01 (describing arbitration's "elite" nature).
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significant, often several million dollars or more for the secretariat charges,
fees to arbitrator and counsel fees. (These were over $6 million in the
NAFTA Pope & Talbot case.)" 295 Other commentators refer to the alleged
$4 million costs of the investor in the Metalclad case.296 Still others point
to the report that the Czech Republic spent US$10 million on its defense of
two claims and budgeted US$3.3 million in 2004 and US$13.8 million in
2005 for legal fees.297 Other commentators focus only on costs of cases
decided against investors without considering cases decided against
governments. 298 The ability to generalize these claims is unclear.
Some commentators have made general claims about the possible
range of costs. Canadian officials suggest that "[c]osts depend on the
amount of time needed by the tribunal to hear and decide the case" and
assert that an "investor's 50% share of tribunal costs has ranged between
$500,000 and $1.5 million. 299 Similarly, ICSID estimated that the average
cost of investor-state arbitration, excluding fees for legal counsel, is around
US$220,000. 3° Referencing a "[p]reliminary" study whose methodology
was not disclosed, UNCTAD reported:
295. DAVID A. GANTZ, INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION UNDER ICSID, THE ICSID
ADDITIONAL FACILITY AND THE UNCTAD ARBITRAL RULES 23 (U.S. Vietnam Trade Council
Seminar Series, 2004), http://www.usvtc.org/trade/other/Gantz/GantzICSID.pdf. Gantz
observed:
ICSID fees are a minimum of $15,000 and can be much higher, particularly if there are
drawn-out proceedings and multiple hearings. ICSID arbitrators are usually paid at the
rate of $2400 per day ($300 per hour), but may be negotiated upwards if arbitrators so
demand. Travel expenses may be steep, as most of the arbitrators, the parties and
counsel will have to travel to the hearings (usually in Washington, D.C. if ICSID is
acting as secretariat). The parties may agree to hold hearings elsewhere, but travel costs
are likely to be substantial regardless. Legal fees for major law firms who represent
investors and host governments range from $200 to $500 per hour, but may be negotiable
(downward).
Id.
296. Peterson, supra note 293; J.C. Thomas, A Reply to Professor Brower, 40 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 433, 437 n. 18 (2002).
297. UNCTAD, Review, supra note 59, at 10; see also UNCTAD, 2006 IIA Monitor No. 4,
supra note 59, at 6-7 (referring to two cases related to the allocation of costs and attorney's fees).
Others appear to rely upon a non-random sample of awards to make a point about the larger
population. See, e.g., Stephen W. Schill, Arbitration Risk and Effective Compliance: Cost-
Shifting in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 653, 660-74 (2006).
298. Hamida, supra note 291. This piece is an improvement on many other empirical projects
as it tries to explain its research methodology. It does not, however, explain how the cases were
selected or coded. Id.
299. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Canada's Foreign Investment Protection
and Promotion Agreements (FIPAs), Canada's FIPA Program: It's [sic] Purpose, Objective and
Content, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/flpa-
apie/fipa-purpose.aspx?lang=en (last visited Nov. 30, 2007).
300. Ibrahim Shihata & Antonio Parra, The Experience of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes, 14 ICSID REV. 299, 334 (1999).
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[R]ecent awards suggests that the average legal costs incurred by
governments are $1-to-$2 million, including lawyers' fees; the costs
for the tribunal, about $400,000 or more; and the costs for the
claimant about the same as for the defendant.3 1
The wide variation in estimates illustrates the need for valid and
reliable data on arbitration costs to permit parties to understand the
financial consequences of pursuing their rights or a defense. This study
considered two different types of costs: the Tribunals' Costs and Expenses
("TCE") and the Parties' Legal Costs ("PLC").
The data related to arbitration costs is unfortunately limited.
Important data was missing from the text of publicly available awards, and
tribunals did not always precisely describe how they dealt with TCE or
PLC. For example, a tribunal might state an investor was responsible for
paying two-thirds of TCE but fail to quantify the amount.30 2 In other
awards, the tribunal did not address costs at all.303 While one must
therefore recognize the limitations of the current data, one might hope that
in time, tribunals could be encouraged to be more transparent on cost
issues."°
1. TCE: Tribunal's Costs and Expenses
Out of the 102 awards, only fifty contained TCE decisions and only
seventeen quantified TCE °.3 5 Given the small number of awards with TCE
data, care should be taken in making inferences.
301. UNCTAD, Disputes on the Rise, supra note 59, at 4; see UNCTAD, Review, supra note
59, at 8.
302. See Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates, ICSID Case No. ARB/02f7, July 7, 2004, at 31,
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Soufraki_000.pdf. Similar things happen in the context of the
parties' legal costs and expenses. See Ethyl Award, supra note 89, at 48 (ordering the payment of
costs but failing to articulate a specific amount at that phase).
303. In Fedax, there was no discussion of costs at all in the jurisdictional decision. Fedax
N.V. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 11, 1997), 37
I.L.M. 1378 (1998), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Fedax-1997-Last.pdf. In another variation,
there may be a decision to reserve the issue of costs but without an explanation of why. PSEG
Global Inc. v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, at 54, Decision on Jurisdiction (June 4, 2004),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/psegdecision.pdf.
304. Similar to the data regarding damages, it may be possible that there is a difference
between amounts tribunals state are due in an award and what is actually received. In the case of
TCE, it is possible that tribunals receive the full amount of their requested fees-particularly for
those institutional arbitrations where parties must submit advance deposits for arbitrator fees and
may even be asked for additional contributions during the course of the proceedings. As such
advances are not collected for PLC, parties may be less likely to collect fully upon a tribunal's
PLC award.
305. These seventeen awards came from sixteen different cases. One case, CME v. Czech




Of the seventeen awards, the total average award tribunals made for
their costs and expenses was US$581,332.70.3°6 The smallest amount for
TCE was US$31,088.10 in Iurii Bogdanov v. Moldova,3 °7 whereas the
largest was in Methanex at US$1.5 million." 8
Tribunals tended to issue awards that assessed nearly equivalent TCE
contributions for both investors and governments. For the seventeen
awards, tribunals made awards that required investors to contribute an
average of US$289,753 to the TCE. Meanwhile, the average government
contribution was US$291,580. The difference between these two figures
was not significant.3°
2. PLC: Parties' Legal Costs
Because it was not quantified or was quantified oddly,3" ° PLC totals
were not collected. Data was gathered, however, about the extent to which
tribunals shifted PLC. These results therefore do not fully reflect the legal
costs parties experienced in arbitration. It does reflect parties' actual cost-
shifting experiences.
Out of the 102 awards, fifty-four awards contained PLC decisions, and
forty-one awards did not shift PLC.311 Instead parties bore their own legal
costs. Thirteen awards did shift costs. In six cases, investors contributed to
the legal costs of the government; and, in seven cases, the government
contributed to the investor's legal costs.
In the thirteen awards shifting PLC, only eleven quantified the amount
of the shift, 3 2 and the average amount shifted was US$655,407.31 3 Unlike
TCE, there was a difference in investors' and governments' average
contribution to a PLC shift. The average PLC contribution made by
investors (n=5) was US$927,635. The average PLC contribution made by
306. The median was US$501,370.
307. Iurii Bogdanov v. Moldova, Arbitral Award, at 20 (SCC Sept. 22, 2005),
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Bogdanov-Moldova-22September2005.pdf.
308. Methanex Award, supra note 33, at 1464.
309. The median investor contribution was US$203,377, and the mode was US$0. The
median government contribution was US$141,191, and the mode was US$0. The difference
between these was US$62,186.
310. See Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award
(June 21, 1990), 30 I.L.M. 577, 626 (ICSID 1991) (awarding a party a portion of its requested
legal costs but failing to articulate the amount actually expended or requested).
311. These fifty-four awards originated from fifty-three cases. Only one case, Wena v. Egypt,
had two awards that each addressed PLC. Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, (ICSID
June 29, 1999), 41 I.L.M. 881, 886; Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, (ICSID Dec. 8,
2000), 41 I.L.M. 896, 910.
312. The two awards shifting PLC but failing to quantify the PLC shift were Eureko v.
Poland, Eureko Award, supra note 173, at 88, and Ethyl v. Canada, Ethyl Award, supra note 89,
at 51.
313. The median was US$318,918.
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governments (n=6) was US$428,551. In other words, although the parties
made approximately equal contributions to the tribunal's costs, tribunals
required investors to contribute nearly twice as much as governments to the
opposing party's legal expenses. While small numbers make it difficult to
generalize the results, the data suggests that the financial burden on
governments in defending the claims may not be as great as thought.
3. Future Research
Quantifying the potential costs and benefits of arbitration promotes the
ability of stakeholders to make informed decisions about one aspect of
possible dispute resolution strategies. • Future research should consider
other issues beyond the quantification of arbitration costs. It might, for
example, look at PLC and TCE determinations in greater detail. It might
evaluate whether tribunals referred to legal authority or rationales in
making their decisions and what authorities and rationales were most
common. It may also consider whether there was a statistically significant
relationship between cost shifting and variables discussed in this Article.
With a fuller picture of arbitration costs-and how and when tribunals may
be inclined to shift costs-parties will be in a better position to make more
informed dispute resolution choices. It may also aid governments
negotiating investment treaties. Governments might, for example, establish
cost-shifting rules in treaties and create guidelines about how tribunals
should exercise their discretion. While such information on costs will no
doubt be one variable in a broader mix affecting these determinations, the
quantification of these factors can aid stakeholders.
G. Claim #6: Are Other Forms of Dispute Resolution Used?
Arbitration is only one of many dispute resolution choices." 4 There is
an emerging literature questioning whether exclusive use of arbitration is
the most effective way to resolve investment treaty disputes." 5 Some
314. The classic formulation is that the "forum [should] fit the fuss." Frank E.A. Sander &
Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR
Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49, 50 (1994).
315. See Jack C. Coe, Jr., Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State
Disputes-A Preliminary Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 7, 13, 22 (2005); Franck,
supra note 9; Barton Legum, The Difficulties of Conciliation on Investment Treaty Cases: A
Comment on Professor Jack C. Coe 's Towards a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-
State Disputes A Preliminary Sketch, 21 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 72 (2006); Ucheora
Onwuamaegbu, The Role of ADR in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The ICSID Experience,
22 NEWS FROM ICSID, 12, 12 (2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org
/icsid/news/news_2-.pdf; Noah Rubins, Comments to Jack C. Coe Jr. 's Article on Conciliation,
21 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 23 (2006); Salacuse, Explanations, supra note 9; Thomas Walde,
Mediation/Alternative Dispute Resolution in Oil, Gas and Energy Transactions: Superior to
Arbitration/Litigation from a Commercial and Management Perspective, 1 TRANSNAT'L DiSP.
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commentators suggest investment arbitration has "rarely led to settlement,"
and early settlements or claim abandonment is unusual.316 They argue that
once a conflict escalates to a formal arbitration request, there is no turning
back.3"7 Governments dig in their heels and refuse to settle, lest there be
future political fallout.3 8 In contrast, there are news stories about
investment arbitration settlements, such as disputes between Nomura and
the Czech Republic, K+ Venture partners and the Czech Republic, and
Baltic Rail Services and Estonia.3"9 ICSID's 2004 stakeholder survey
demonstrates that stakeholders recognize the utility of settlement.32°
Unfortunately, there has been little empirical enquiry into the claims
of arbitration's presumed superiority, let alone a coherent explanation of
why other dispute resolution systems are less desirable. Research from
ICSIiD suggests that "[c]onciliation is very widely viewed as a useful
mechanism for the settlement of disputes at least in some cases, especially
by member governments," but there was no analysis of the use of ICSID's
conciliation facility.3 21 In the future, it would be useful to study conflict
resolution practices more systematically and perhaps survey disputants to
determine what was efficient and ineffective about their dispute resolution
experiences. In the interim, this research provides information related to
dispute settlement practices in connection with arbitration awards.
MGMT. 2, 2 (2004), available at http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepnp/journal/htmlIVol13/articlel-
.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
316. Coe, supra note 60, at 1400.
317. See Coe, supra note 315, at 24; Legum, supra note 315, at 74 (noting "the best chance to
resolve a dispute between a foreign investor and a government agency is likely before the
investment dispute becomes a dispute under an investment treaty").
318. Franck, supra note 9 (manuscript at 72-73, on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
319. These three settlements occurred between November 30, 2006 and January 26, 2007.
Czech Republic Settles K+ Claim, GLOBAL ARB. REV., Jan. 26, 2007, available at
http://www.global arbitrationreview.com/news/newsitem.cfmitemid=3675; Estonia Ends
Railway Dispute, GLOBAL ARB. REV., Jan. 26, 2007, available at http://www.global
arbitrationreview.comlnews/newsitem.cfm?itemjid=3677; Nomura and Czech Republic Drop
Claims, GLOBAL ARB. REV., Dec. I, 2006, available at http://www.globalarbitration
review.comlnews/newsitem.cfm?item_id=3622; see also ICSID, List of Concluded Cases,
ICSID Case No. ARB/06/6, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm (last visited
Nov. 11, 2007) [hereinafter ICSID, Concluded Cases] (observing the existence of a settlement in
Rail World LLC v. Estonia) (all on file with the North Carolina Law Review). It is unclear,
however, whether these three examples are representative of a larger pattern.
320. ICSID, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETrLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES:
STAKEHOLDER SURVEY 15 (2004), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/icsid-client-
survey-100904.pdf [hereinafter ICSID Stakeholder Survey] (suggesting 29% of cases settled or
were discontinued). The survey does not distinguish, however, between claims under investment
treaties and commercial cases arising under domestic law.
321. Id. at 16 (reporting that 54% of all survey respondent's indicated they "consider
conciliation a useful mechanism for settlement of investment disputes," and that 79% of
governments made that statement).
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1. Awards Embodying Settlement Agreements
There is evidence that investor treaty claims can be settled. One need
look no further than awards embodying the parties' settlement agreement.
In the population of eighty-two cases, there were two awards
embodying settlement agreements: Lemire v. Ukraine and Goetz v.
Burundi.322 There was also a case that was part of the population-IBM v.
Ecuador-that involved an award embodying a settlement,323 but because
that settlement was not publicly available as at June 1, 2006,324 it was
omitted from the population.
These three cases have an interesting commonality. Settlement in all
three cases was preceded by a critical decision by the arbitral tribunal. In
Lemire v. Ukraine, the award describes a tribunal decision to join
jurisdiction to the merits of the dispute. Within a month of that decision,
the investor initiated settlement discussions; and, approximately five
months later, the parties reached settlement.326 In Goetz v. Burundi, the
tribunal issued a decision addressing liability and applicable law.
Approximately three and a half months later, the parties settled.327 In IBM,
seven months after the investor won the jurisdictional phase, the tribunal
rendered an award embodying a settlement agreement.
3 28
These findings suggest that parties should not discount other dispute
resolution opportunities that might lead to settlement. It also suggests that
much like the practice of "litigotiation"-where litigation is used to
increase strategic leverage in the negotiation proces 329-strategic use of
arbitration can create opportunities to engage in nonbinding dispute
resolution. In comparison to the total number of cases, the number of
settlement agreements seems low. Research compiled by Professor Coe
suggests that settlement procedures in the international and domestic
commercial contexts can have "high" settlement rates, sometimes in the
order of 80%.330 By contrast, the finding that only two out of fifty-two
322. Lemire Award, supra note 48, Goetz Award, supra note 80, at 454, 456.
323. IBM, Jurisdiction, supra note 79, at 3.
324. ICSID, Concluded Cases, supra note 319 (referring to an "award embodying the parties'
settlement rendered on July 22, 2004").
325. Lemire Award, supra note 48, at 532.
326. Id. at 535.
327. Obadia, supra note 209, at 454-55.
328. IBM, Jurisdiction, supra note 79; ICSID, Concluded Cases, supra note 319.
329. Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984) (coining the term "litigotiation"); see also Gary Goodpaster,
Lawsuits as Negotiations, 8 NEGOTIATION J. 221 (1992) (exploring the interplay between
litigation and negotiation); Chris Guthrie, Principles of Influence in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L.
REV. 829, 835 (2004); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's
Justice Got To Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787,789 (2001).
330. Coe, supra note 315, at 18 n.57.
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awards (3.85%) finally resolve treaty claims with settlements appears
lower. This may be in part because the populations of study are different.
This research did not analyze disputes that were settled prior to the
initiation of arbitration and instead analyzed public awards. These two
factors may affect the external validity as it prevents analysis of
confidential settlements33' that occur either before or after the initiation of
arbitration. Despite these limitations, the data is a useful to start.
2. Case Disposition
Instead of focusing on settlement agreements in awards, this section
considers settlement by the cases' ultimate disposition. It compares the
population with publicly available information from the Internet (including
the ICSID Web site)332 as of June 1, 2006.
The eighty-two cases had three different types of dispositions, some of
which were final and some of which were not yet final. Final dispositions
were most common. In particular, cases were most frequently disposed of
through a final and binding award (fifty-three in total333).3 4 Six cases were
either settled or discontinued. For those nonfinal dispositions, there were
twenty-three cases that were still ongoing 35 (See Chart 8).
331. Recent research suggests that, contrary to conventional wisdom, making settlements
confidential may actually inhibit settlement opportunities. See Scott A. Moss, Illuminating
Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 872
(2007).
332. ICSID, ICSID Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cases.htm (last visited Nov.
11,2007).
333. This includes fifty-two awards finally resolving investment treaty claims as well as the
final award that embodied a settlement in IBM v. Ecuador, supra note 77.
334. This study did not track later activity such as annulment or set-aside proceedings in
national courts. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
335. Some cases that were on-going as of June 1, 2006 have resulted in awards. See, e.g.,
supra note 276 (referring to cases where there are now damage determinations).
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Final Award Issued Ongoing Case on 6/1/2006 Case Settled or Discontinued
Type of Disposition
Chart 8: Disposition of all cases in the population (N=82) as on June 1,
2006 showing cases (1) subject to a final award, including awards
incorporating settlement agreements (n=53), (2) part of an ongoing case
that was not complete at the time (n=23), or (3) settled or discontinued
(n=6).
This suggests that other dispute resolution methods-whether
negotiation, mediation, or abandonment of the conflict-can end a dispute
after initiating arbitration. Nevertheless, six cases out of eighty-two results
in a termination rate of 7.32%. This is still lower than the settlement rates
obtained in the dispute resolution contexts previously mentioned.336
It is unclear how these cases were settled and what prompted cases to
be discontinued. Further research might analyze discontinued disputes to
isolate factors affecting parties' dispute resolution decisions and
satisfaction with the results. It may be possible, for example, that
likelihood of settlement is adversely affected by the uncertainty in the
dispute resolution process. To the extent that inconsistent case law makes
it difficult to estimate the likelihood of success and damage awards, this
can inhibit effective settlement. Likewise-considering that average
arbitration costs can be a key proportion of the average arbitration
award337-not being able to reasonably predict arbitration costs and/or how
the tribunals will shift costs (if at all) creates challenges in estimating the
cost of pursuing arbitration. As such, it may be difficult to create a
business case for settlement-particularly where governments have not
336. See Coe, supra note 315, at 18 n.57.
337. Recall that the average TCE is US$581,332.70 and average PLC shifts is
US$655,406.99. Should parties be unable to predict how tribunals will shift costs, there can be
difficulties. This US$1,236,739.69 uncertainty, particularly when the average damage award was
US$10,389,459, may make it difficult to use settlement strategies effectively. See supra notes
306-313 and accompanying text.
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allocated funds and may need to go through the political process to finalize
settlement.
H. Claim #7." Are Arbitrators a "Pale, Male, and Stale"33 "Mafia'9
A final area of confusion in investment treaty arbitration is who the
arbitrators are. Beyond an obligation to be independent and impartial,3"
there are generally no minimum qualifications that an arbitrator must have
to be appointed.34" ' Parties are thus generally free to select arbitrators of
their choosing.342
338. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Madame La Prisidente: A Woman Who Sits As President of
a Major Arbitral Tribunal Is a Rare Creature. Why?, AM. LAW: Focus EUR., Summer 2004,
available at http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/arbitration04.html ("[A]rbitration is
dominated by a few aging men, many of whom pioneered the field. In the words of Sarah
Franqois-Poncet of Salans, the usual suspects are 'pale, male, and stale.' ").
339. For the purposes of this Article, the term "mafia" refers to a relatively closed group of
individuals adjudicating international arbitrations. It is not intended to suggest arbitrators are
engaged in a criminal enterprise. The term "mafia" was chosen because commentators and
arbitrators refer to the "arbitration mafia." See YVEs DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING
IN VIRTUE 10 (1996); see also William W. Park, National Legal Systems and Private Dispute
Resolution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 616, 623-24 (1988) (book review) ("[A] junior arbitrator may
defer to a more senior member of the international arbitration mafia in the hope of being
recommended in another case."); Tom Canning, International Arbitrators: Conflicts of Interest
and Bias, DLA PIPER, Apr. 2006, http://www.dlapiper.com/files/Publication/ac5ad590-0185-
45ed-b344-a591 e460c7e6/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/36414f3f-b2e8-4bea-8f77-
21462393c83c/InterArbitrationNewsletteraprO6.htm (referring to the "relatively small pool of
regularly appointed international arbitrators (often referred to as the 'arbitration mafia')");
Cameron Timmis, Firm Grip on Disputes, GAZETTE (London), Mar. 16, 2006, at 18, 18,
available at http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/features/view=feature.law?FEATUREID=272151
("Because of the confidentiality of most international arbitration work, it has always had a certain
mystique-indeed, its leading exponents have long been tagged the 'arbitration mafia'."); Neil
Kaplan, The Good, The Bad and the Ugly, available at http://www.cannonway.com/web/
page.php?page=109 (last visited Nov. 11, 2007) ("We must embrace more well-qualified and
fiercely independent arbitrators from developing countries into the arbitration [mafia].").
340. See ICSID Convention supra note 47, arts. 14(1), 40(2) (requiring an exercise of
"independent judgment"); ICSID, Additional Facility Rules, sched. C, art. 8 (2006) [hereinafter
ICSID/AF Rules], available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm (requiring an
exercise of "independent judgment"); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 47, arts. 6(4), 9
(permitting challenges to arbitrators where there are "justifiable doubts as to the arbitrators
impartiality or independence"); SCC Rules, supra note 89, art. 14 (requiring arbitrators to be
"impartial and independent"); Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration, art. 7 (1997)
[hereinafter ICC Rules], available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/pdf-
documents/rules/rulesarb-english.pdf (requiring arbitrator "independence"); see also Catherine
A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1301, 1314-
15 (2006) (noting that subjective arbitration discretion has been reduced by implementation of
objectives, standards, and increased transparency); Richard C. Rueben, Confidentiality in
Arbitration: Beyond the Myth, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1276 (2006) (explaining "real and
perceived impartiality of the arbitrator is widely recognized as a core value of the process").
341. Many rules for investment treaty arbitration establish the procedure for arbitrator
appointment and challenge but do not articulate substantive, baseline qualifications. See
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 47, arts. 6-11; SCC Rules, supra note 89, arts. 13-16;
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Arbitrators make decisions of international significance but are not
necessarily accountable to the public, and they may not even be
accountable to the parties that appoint them.343  This potential
accountability gap raises concerns about the system's legitimacy when
there is a gap in the demographics of those making the decisions and those
affected by them.3" Public Citizen, for example, has urged citizens to
"oppose these outrageous 'investor-to-state' provisions in trade and
investment agreements." '345
Some have called international arbitrators a "mafia or a club.
' 346
Others express concern "that ICSID arbitrators are predominantly nationals
from developed countries, the implication being that they may be more
favorably inclined towards investors. 347  Others have observed that the
number of women in arbitration is so small that they are "an anomaly" and
that there is not even a term in some languages to describe female
arbitrators. In the words of a prominent female arbitrator: "Lawyers are
ICC Rules, supra note 340, arts. 7, 9. ICSID is a notable exception. Both ICSID Convention and
Additional Facility arbitration require arbitrators to be persons of "high moral character and
recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance." ICSID Convention,
supra note 47, arts. 14(1) and 40(2); ICSID/AF Rules, supra note 340, art. 8.
342. See supra note 341 and accompanying text (discussing methods of arbitrator
appointment). But see Emilia Onyema, Empirically Determined Factors in Appointing
Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration, 73 ARB. 199, 200--04 (2007) (suggesting
that in some institutional arbitrations there are institutions that retain discretion to approve a party
nomination).
343. Arbitrators are responsible for rendering an award. In some, but not all, jurisdictions,
arbitrators may not be liable for misconduct. See generally Susan D. Franck, The Liability of
International Arbitrators: A Comparative Analysis and Proposal for Qualified Immunity, 20
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2000); Peter B. Rutledge, Toward a Contractual Approach
for Arbitral Immunity, 39 GA. L. REV. 151 (2004).
344. Trading Democracy, supra note 235 (suggesting that arbitrators are "a three-man
tribunal, drawn mostly from a select pool of experts" and suggesting this is an "exclusive court
for capital. American citizens not admitted.").
345. See, e.g., Public Citizen, Global Trade Watch: Promoting Democracy by Challenging
Corporate Globalization, http://www.citizen.org/trade/nafta/CH 1 l/articles.cfm?ID=6687 (last
visited Nov. 11, 2007).
346. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 339, at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Rogers, supra note 215, at 968 (stating that the "market for international arbitrators operates as a
relatively closed system that is difficult for newcomers to penetrate").
347. Dafilino, supra note 201. Daftino would likely take issue with the substantive validity of
this urban legend given his suggestion that the implication that arbitrators favor investors "is
baseless since the fact is that the outcomes of ICSID arbitrations are equally divided, almost
exactly 50150, in awards for investors and for States." Id. There are suggestions, however, that
this western orientation is also present in the context of international commercial arbitration. See
Dr. K.V.S.K. Nathan, Well, Why Did You Not Get the Right Arbitrator?, 15-7 MEALEY'S INT'L
ARB. REP. 10 (2000), available at LEXIS.com (noting that "[t]he majority in a multi-member
international arbitral tribunal is always white," and interpreting a British arbitrator's commentary
as improperly suggesting that, "arbitrators from the developing countries and women simply do
not or cannot satisfy the selection criteria" for arbitrators).
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sometimes embarrassed, and they don't know what to call me ... Do they
say, 'Madame la prrsidente' or 'Madame le prrsidente?' "I'
Others disagree. They assert that these "characterizations 'lack a solid
evidentiary basis.' "I' Meanwhile, ICSID has described its efforts to
"enlarge and diversify the pool of arbitrators."35 In 2004, arbitrators were
appointed from twenty-eight different countries and more than half of these
had their first ICSID appointment. In 2005, twenty of sixty-eight
appointees were from developing countries and four were women. 5'
Although focusing on ICSID arbitration,352 a recent project found that over
60% of arbitrators had received only a single appointment. There was,
however, a group of fifteen "elite" individuals with eight or more
appointments. One article reported a mix of nationalities but noted,
"nationals of developed states are proportionately over-represented by
number of ICSID nominations. 3 53  They also observed that women
comprised "a mere fourteen of the 279 arbitrators who have heard
claims. 354
This research found that out of 102 awards, 100 awards had three-
member tribunals, and sole arbitrators rendered two awards. In the 102
awards from the eighty-two different cases, there were 145 different
arbitrators. Some, but by no means a majority of arbitrators, served in
multiple cases. This begins to rebut the claim that arbitration is a "mafia."
The substantive impact of repeat appointments should be analyzed
thoroughly in the future.
1. Arbitrator Nationality
The nationality of the arbitrators was determined by the arbitrator
nationality described in the awards, the ICSID Web site, or a Google
348. Goldhaber, supra note 338; see also DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 339, at 33-36
(describing the "grand old men" who "played a central role in the emergence and the recognition
of arbitration"); see also Louise Barrington, Arbitral Women: A Study of Women in International
Commercial Arbitration, in THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE: THE 1996 INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF THE CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS 229-41 (Geoffrey M. Beresford
Hartwell ed., 1996) (describing the lack of women but their increasing presence in international
commercial arbitration).
349. Jan Paulsson, Ethics, Elitism, Eligibility, J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1997, at 13, 19; see also
Naimark & Keer, supra note 286, at 156 (citing the Paulsson article).
350. Dafiino, supra note 201.
351. Id.
352. The article stated that it was "taken from the ICSID website on 21 September 2006."
Rubins et al., supra note 51, at 11-12. It did not explain how data was coded. Considering data
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search.355 The 145 arbitrators who decided these cases came from forty
different countries. 6  The largest number of arbitrators from a single
country (n=27, 18.6%) was from the United States. The next largest
number of arbitrators (n=14, 9.7%) was from the United Kingdom. The
third most represented country was Mexico with eleven (7.6%) arbitrators.
Other countries with larger numbers of arbitrators were Canada (n=8),
France (n=8), Germany (n=6), Sweden (n=6), Italy (n=5), Switzerland
(n=5), Ecuador (n=5), Australia (n=4), and Spain (n=4). 7
Overall, 109 arbitrators (75% of the population) came from OECD
countries. This is consistent with the assertion that there are large numbers
of arbitrators from Western countries.
This may in part be explainable, as parties may have an inclination to
appoint arbitrators who are likely to understand and be sympathetic to their
legal, cultural, and political traditions. For countries like the United States,
which find themselves the subject and object of treaty claims, the large
number of U.S. arbitrators may not be surprising. Likewise, although there
were no Mexican investors bringing claims, the number of claims against
Mexico may partially explain the relatively large number of Mexican
arbitrators.
This inclination of appointing nationals cannot explain all of the data.
For instance, there was one arbitrator from Senegal, which the United
Nations has defined as an LDC,358 but Senegal has not been a respondent in
treaty arbitration.359 There are other countries that appear to experience this
"overrepresentation" of nationals acting as arbitrators. Australia and
Uruguay were notable in that they had multiple arbitrators deciding cases,
355. Only one coder coded this data. See supra note 96. For this coding, the author ran
Google searches looking for a curriculum vitae, professional biography or equivalent information
on Web sites such as ICSID or the International Arbitration Institute, http://www.iaiparis.conV
(last visited Nov. 27, 2007). Where the nationality was stated, the data was recorded. In the case
of any uncertainty, nationality was not coded. This accounts for the eight arbitrators whose
nationality could not be identified. See infra note 356. Future studies should keep a verifiable
record of how nationality data was identified and coded. Defining a person's nationality can be
difficult because arbitrators can be dual nationals, born one place, live in another, practice in
another, and have law degrees from different countries.
356. There were eight arbitrators whose nationality could not be identified from publicly
available materials.
357. There were also arbitrators from the Czech Republic (n=2), Egypt (n=2), Venezuela
(n=2), Algeria (n=l), Chile (n=i), and Poland (n=l).
358. See supra note 129 (placing Senegal on the list of Least Developed Countries).
359. In that case, ICSID was responsible for recommending and appointing Judge Kdba
Mbaye. American Manufacturing and Trading, Inc. v. Rep. of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/I,
Award Feb. 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1531, 1536, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/American




but neither their investors nor governments were involved in a case. 360
Similarly, certain countries were involved in a small number of cases but
nevertheless produced a large numbers of arbitrators. The United
Kingdom, for example, only had 5% of the population of investors and was
not subjected to arbitration. Nevertheless, 10% (14 out of 145) of the
arbitrators came from the United Kingdom. France, Germany, Sweden,
and Switzerland also had a larger number of arbitrators than cases. With
the exception of Uruguay, non-OECD countries did not experience
overrepresentation.
Likewise, there were also countries that may be underrepresented.
United States investors account for 42% of all total investors in the cases,
and the United States was a respondent in 5% of the cases. Only 18% of
arbitrators were from the United States. Argentina appears to be another
outlier as it was involved in fifteen cases (18%) as respondent and had one
Argentinean investor. Only one of the 145 arbitrators came from
Argentina. With three cases brought against them but no Pakistani
arbitrators, Pakistan also experienced a similar phenomenon (See Appendix
1).
While there appeared to be some breadth in the pool of arbitrators, this
data suggests that the depth was uncertain. It appears that 75% of the
arbitrator pool was from OECD countries even though approximately 70%
of the disputes were against non-OECD governments.36" ' To the extent that
the adjudicators are unrepresentative, some may believe that this casts
doubt upon the legitimacy of the dispute resolution process.
Lest the data be misinterpreted, it is important to note certain things.
First, an arbitrator from a single country can be appointed in multiple cases.
For example, while it is not yet clear whether this is a representative
example, the single arbitrator from Chile was in nine cases.362 If this were
a common occurrence, it would expand the influence of repeat arbitrators
from a particular country. Second, because parties typically choose
arbitrators, this may alleviate some concerns that arbitrators are not
representative adjudicators. Governments like Argentina and Pakistan had
360. There was also one arbitrator from each of the following countries: Austria, Brazil,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Israel, Lebanon, New Zealand,
Senegal, and Thailand. None of these countries were respondents or had investors who had used
treaty arbitration nor had been respondent governments.
361. The data that 75% of the arbitrator pool comes from OECD countries may seem of less
concern when one recalls that nearly 89% of investors came from OECD countries.
362. Prof. Francisco Orrego Vicufia was an arbitrator in Fedax N.V. v Venezuela, Camuzzi
Int'l S.A. v. Argentina [English], Maffezini v. Spain, Enron Corp. v. Argentina, PSEG Global,
Inc. v. Turkey, Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, CMS Gas Transmission Co. v.
Argentina, Joy Mining Mach. Ltd. v. Egypt, and Sempra Energy v. Argentina.
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opportunities to appoint their own nationals as arbitrators, for example, but
failed to do so.
It may be that arbitrator selection is not about the utility of appointing
locals instead of foreigners. Factors such as arbitrator nationality may be
of little concern.3 63 Rather, appointment may be more about the market for
arbitrator expertise and experience. 3" That having been said, the arbitrator
marketplace may not be functioning effectively. There may be structural,
educational, social, and financial barriers that prevent arbitrators from
gaining the expertise and experience necessary to receive an appointment
in a case that involves novel issues of international and investment law
with allegations of significant government liability. One recent analysis of
international commercial arbitration, for example, identified arbitrator
"reputation" as the top factor in appointment and indicated that information
on reputation was obtained "from informal contacts, personal knowledge
[and] recommendation of outside counsel." '365 For parties who are not
repeat players or otherwise lack the ability to hire elite international law
firms with unique expertise about arbitrator reputation, there may be
informational gaps. This phenomenon could lead to market malfunction.366
Future research should analyze nationality in greater detail. For
example, it would be helpful to consider whether governments from non-
OECD countries are appointing arbitrators from OECD or non-OCED
countries. It also might enquire into what factors affect arbitrator
appointment and barriers to entering the arbitrator marketplace. Likewise,
it might consider whether the ultimate result depends on whether the chair
of the tribunal comes from an OECD or a non-OECD country.
363. The concept of "nationality" itself may be a social construct as arbitrators may be
"nationals" of one country in a strict sense but may have allegiances to other jurisdictions. See
supra note 355 and accompanying text. For example, although Pakistan did not appoint a
Pakistani arbitrator, it has appointed an English barrister with ties to Pakistan who was involved
in drafting the 1996 English Arbitration Act. See Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction (Apr. 22, 2005), 3,
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/impregilo-decision.pdf.; Toby Landou, Essex Court Chambers,
http://www.essexcourt.net/barrister?b=48 (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
364. One survey of participants in international commercial arbitration asked what factors
affected their choice of arbitrators. The top five responses were (1) reputation of the arbitrator,
(2) expertise in the subject matter of the dispute, (3) recommendations of external counsel, (4)
knowledge of the relevant language, and (5) knowledge of the law applicable to the dispute.
Onyema, supra note 342, at 205.
365. Id.
366. For a discussion of conflicts of interest and difficulties related to the void of public
information about arbitrators, see generally Rogers, supra note 215; Catherine A. Rogers,
Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to Developing Standards of
Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53 (2005); Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics:
Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 341 (2002).
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Future research might provide insights into the impact, if any, that
nationality has on the arbitration process and its systemic acceptability.
Should there be sufficient data, it may be possible to determine which
arbitrators (or groups of arbitrators from particular countries) have made
certain decisions, whether procedural or substantive, in the past. Although
past behavior may not be a reliable indicator of future conduct, this
information may be of utility to stakeholders who are interested in
information about appointments. In any event, given ICSID's recent
efforts to expand the pool of arbitrators in those cases where it controls
appointment, future research may find greater diversification of arbitral
tribunals.
2. Arbitrator Gender
Women were a tiny fraction of arbitrators in investment treaty
arbitration. There were five women (3.5%) in the population of 145
investment treaty arbitrators.
This lack of women appears to be meaningful.367 In comparison, 30%
of practicing lawyers and 15% of the federal judiciary in the United States
are women. 368  Even in countries such as Malawi, women were better
represented in adjudication. Four out of twenty-four justices of the Malawi
High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal were women, and there were
fifteen women among the country's 153 magistrates.3 69  Even though
Malawi has been criticized for its lack of women in the judiciary, women
had greater representation there than in investment treaty arbitration.
Given their small number in the population, it is possible to identify
each woman easily and determine the scope of involvement in the
arbitration process. Gabrielle Kaufman-Kohler arbitrated four cases.
Sandra Rico was on two tribunals. Carolyn Lamm, Guidetta Moss, and
Tatiana de Maekelt were each on a single case. Although one of the sole
arbitrators was a woman, there were no tribunals with two or more women.
367. There is unfortunately not a single database that defines the worldwide population of
potential arbitrators. This research therefore considers women in various national judiciaries to
serve as a proximate baseline for comparison.
368. Deborah Rhode's study reflects that women account for only about 15% of law firm
partners, 10% of law school deans and general counsels, 5% of managing partners at large firms,
and a mere 15% of all federal judges. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ABA COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN
THE PROFESSION, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA: WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 5 (2001),
available at http://womenlaw.stanford.edu/aba.unfinished.agenda.pdf.; Leah V. Durant, Gender
Bias and the Legal Profession: A Discussion of Why There Are Still So Few Women on the
Bench, 4 MARGINS: MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 181, 181 (2004).
369. Sid Gloppen & Fidelis Edge Kanyongolo, Courts and the Poor in Malawi: Economic
Marginalization, Vulnerability, and the Law, 5 INT'L J. CONST. L. 258, 289 (2007).
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In total, the five women appeared in only nine cases and were present in
11% of all awards37 ° (See Chart 9).










All Male Tribunals One Female Tribunal Member
Gender Breakdown of Tribunals
Chart 9: Breakdown of cases in investment treaty arbitration (N = 82)
where tribunals had either one female member (n = 9) or were composed
exclusively of men (n = 73).
Not unlike the problems with the arbitrator pool with respect to issues
of nationality, the data reflects a lack of depth in the population of female
arbitrators. Beyond the concerns about the arbitrator marketplace
identified related to nationality, there are special issues as regards the
gender of tribunals. While half of U.S. law school graduates may be
female, 7' this may not be true for all countries. Moreover, to the extent
that there are qualified women, they may be sitting as judges372 or partners
in private practice,373 and conflicts of interest may inhibit them from sitting
as arbitrators. This may be why at least three of the women (Kaufmann-
Kohler, de Maekelt, and Moss) have academic appointments, where they
are less likely to have direct or imputed professional conflicts of interest.374
370. After June 1, 2006, there was an award from a tribunal with two female arbitrators. See
Jan de Nul N.V. and Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/l 3 (June 16, 2006), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/JandeNuljurisdiction06l606.pdf
(rendering award by Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Brigitte Stern and Pierre Mayer).
371. RHODE, supra note 368, at 5.
372. Roslyn Higgins, for example, is the President of the International Court of Justice and an
eminently qualified international law jurist.
373. For example, Lucy Reed, Judith Gill, and Juliet Blanch are eminently qualified
international law and arbitration specialists. The author is unaware, however, of any of these
women being appointed as arbitrators in investment treaty cases.
374. Brigitte Stern, an arbitrator in cases with awards issued after June 1, 2006, has also had
an academic appointment. Future analysis might also consider whether there is a meaningful
difference in the academic credentials of male and female arbitrators.
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In the future, it would be useful to consider the role women play more
systematically. It would, unfortunately, be difficult to do regressions, as
the numbers of women are so small that results cannot achieve statistical
significance. Should the number of women increase over time, one might
usefully conduct studies that consider potential gender differences on issues
such as party success, amount of awards, and treatment of costs. Such
research might be of interest to parties considering arbitrator appointments
and to stakeholders that are interested in the integrity of the process of
resolving investment disputes. It may be that gender is not a statistically
significant variable that contributes to the outcome of arbitration. One
might imagine, for example, that decisions of arbitrators may have more to
do with their personal experiences, legal and business background, or
judicial philosophy and less with a factor like gender. As a result, it would
be useful to isolate and control the effect of gender to eliminate it as a
statistical confound.
A PRELIMINARY SYNTHESIS AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER
ANALYSIS
It is important to remember that investment treaty arbitration is still a
relatively new phenomenon, and the data in this Article scratches the
surface of information about investment treaty dispute resolution. The
results of this limited study suggest both tentative conclusions and areas for
further exploration. Scholars will only be able to assess the value of these
tentative conclusions with replication and convergence of research.
Recognizing the limitations, the initial descriptive quantitative data
from public awards suggest investment treaty arbitration appears to be
functioning relatively well. There is, nevertheless, room for improvement.
Arbitration disputes arose in only forty-nine of 1,700 treaties in
force,375 which suggests that the treaties could be used in the future. Less
than 5% of all investment treaties were arbitrated. This suggests that there
was a potential for more arbitrations that did not materialize-whether
because of the lack of investment, the lack of allegedly inappropriate
government conduct, or the availability of other effective dispute resolution
mechanisms. Overall, there was an increase in awards over time,
particularly in the last decade. Given the increases in foreign investment
and the number of investment treaties, the actual number of cases was still
reasonably small.
There seemed to be some equilibrium in how arbitration was used by
the developed and developing worlds. While claimants tended to be
375. Supra note 25.
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investors from OECD or "high income" countries, some investors from the
developing world also used investment treaty arbitration. A smaller portion
of OECD governments were subjected to claims, but they were still a
meaningful component of the population. Meanwhile, the lion's share of
the claims tended to be against "upper middle income" countries. The
small number of cases against LDCs and "low income" countries suggested
that the dispute resolution risk for the most vulnerable developing countries
may not be overwhelming.
The reasonably equivalent investor and state win rates was relatively
promising. Investors could and did recover but typically did so without
exposing governments to massive liability.376 Nevertheless, the data took
on a different flavor when considering the gap between investors' claimed
damages and actual awards. Further analysis of the causes of and
implications for this gap is warranted. Such analysis might consider
whether structural safeguards could improve the system to address
concerns related to this gap.
There are other areas of potential improvement. There may be room
to improve how investment treaty disputes are resolved. Processes other
than arbitration might be used to resolve investment treaty claims,
potentially on terms that are more beneficial to both parties. More
information would be necessary to determine how and when to use other
methods effectively. Another area of potential improvement relates to the
appointment of arbitrators. While there was breadth in the overall
arbitrator pool, there may be concerns about the lack of diversity with
respect to nationality and gender. Gaps between the decision makers and
those affected by the decisions, whether real or perceived, have
implications for procedural justice and the integrity of the dispute
resolution system.
Given the preliminary nature of this synthesis, more empirical work is
necessary to expand upon and assess the validity and reliability of these
assessments. This would put stakeholders in a better position to make
informed decisions about fundamental issues-whether it involves how to
negotiate an investment treaty, designing a dispute resolution system, or
effectively using existing dispute resolution mechanisms.
Empiricism can and should inform the evaluation and management of
investment treaties and related conflict. We are on the first step of a long
journey to understanding and improving the management of investment
treaty conflict, and future scholarship should build on this initial work.
Vital information can permit policy makers to make more informed choices
about crafting dispute resolution systems, and stakeholders to make
376. Argentina, however, may be an exception to this general proposition.
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informed choices about how to manage their conflict. At some point, there
may even be sufficient data to make empirically based arguments about
operationalizing the costs of entering into an investment treaty or the
legitimacy of the investment treaty network.
Additional and deeper types of empirical analysis should be utilized.
It might, for example, take the form of the more detailed analysis suggested
in this Article. It might also involve deeper statistical analysis of the data
already presented, or it may simply involve expanding the scope of
variables to consider, for example, what factors are most likely to implicate
a tribunal's determinations about cost allocation. Beyond this, future
analysis of investment treaty conflict might also involve other
methodological approaches beyond the analysis of awards. It might require
the use of interviews,377 surveys, or questionnaires378 to measure how
parties use other dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve conflicts, what
factors are associated with successful or unsuccessful use of the process,
and party satisfaction with the process. Scholars might also draw upon the
expanding empirical literature about how judges reach their decisions.379
This may provide a critical opportunity to conduct experiments with
arbitrators to determine what factors influence their decisionmaking and
reveal unconscious biases affecting the arbitration process. It would also
provide an opportunity to analyze decisionmaking in a controlled setting
with greater internal validity without waiting for a catastrophic economic
event.
Overall, should we be willing to utilize it, empirical legal scholarship
can promote the creation of international law institutions and theories that
are guided by actual experience instead of speculation. This can, in turn,
promote systemic accountability and responsiveness to stakeholders.
While the use of such empirical data and its analytical inferences is
ultimately a matter of choice and political will, the availability of data and
analysis has the capacity to promote the legitimacy of an international law
process that affects the daily lives of investors, governments, and
taxpayers. Given what is at stake-namely sovereignty, financial
resources, and sustainable economic development-it is well worth the
effort.
377. Dezalay and Garth's landmark research was based upon interviews of almost 300
participants in international arbitration. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 339, at ix.
378. International commercial arbitration studies have used questionnaires to survey corporate
attitudes and practices. See generally Loukas Mistelis, International Arbitration-Corporate
Attitudes and Practices-12 Perceptions Tested: Myths, Data and Analysis Research Report, 15
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 525 (2004).
379. See generally Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777
(2001).
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Appendix 1: Number of Cases Where Nationals of a Government Arbi-
trated an Investment Treaty Claim Against Another Government vs. Num-
ber of Cases Where the Government Was a Respondent State vs. Number of
State's Nationals Appointed as Arbitrators on a Tribunal Issuing at Least
One Award

















Costa Rica 0 0
Cyprus 1 0


























































Luxembourg* 2 0 0
Malaysia 1 1 0
Mexico* 0 9 11
Moldova 0 2 0
Morocco 0 2 0
Myanmar 0 1 0
Netherlands* 5 0 1
New Zealand* 0 0 1
Pakistan 0 3 0
Paraguay 0 1 0
Peru 1 1 0
Philippines 0 1 1
Poland* 0 1 1
Romania 0 1 0
Russia 1 1 1
Senegal 0 0 1
Singapore 1 0 0
Slovakia* 0 1 0
Spain* 4 1 4
SriLanka 0 2 1
Sweden* 2 0 6
Switzerland* 2 0 5
Thailand 0 0 1
Turkey* 1 1 0
Ukraine 0 3 0
United Arab Emirates 0 1 0
United Kingdom* 5 0 14
United States* 32 4 27
Uruguay 0 0 3
Venezuela 0 1 2
Zaire (now Congo) 0 1 0
Totals 83380 82 137381
Note: * = Member States from the OECD.
380. This accounts for the one case where investors of two different nationalities brought
separate claims in a single case. See supra note 160.
381. The nationality of eight arbitrators could not be determined.
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